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Solomon v. Supreme Court of Florida9/12/2002
Submitted June 26, 2001
This appeal arises from a defamation lawsuit brought by appellant, David Solomon, against the Florida Supreme Court, Florida Bar Board of Governors, and individual Florida Bar related defendants (Florida Bar), regarding the suspension of his license to practice law in the state of Florida. Mr. Solomon argues on appeal that the trial court erred by dismissing his complaint on the ground that, as a branch of a sovereign state, the Florida Supreme Court, the Florida Bar, and other defendants are not amenable to suit in the District of Columbia. We affirm, and the reason why bears brief exposition.
I.
On March 21, 1997, the Florida Bar Board of Governors (Board) held their annual out-of- state meeting at the Willard Hotel, in the District of Columbia. At the meeting, the Board reviewed charges of unprofessional conduct against Mr. Solomon. Based on its findings, the Board voted to recommend the suspension of Mr. Solomon's license to practice law in Florida. The Florida Supreme Court then ordered the suspension of Mr. Solomon's license to practice law in Florida Bar v. Solomon, 711 So. 2d 1141 (Fla.1998).
In his complaint Solomon alleges that during the meeting held in the District of Columbia, false defamatory statements were made about him. Appellant alleges that these statements were forwarded to the Florida Supreme Court, which resulted in his suspension. Solomon avers that as a proximate consequence of the acts of the Florida Board of Governors in the District of Columbia, which "continued and fully matured when [appellee] Supreme Court of Florida finalized its opinion, appellant received damage to his reputation, as well as pain, mental anguish, and humiliation."
II.
The Florida Bar contends that appellant's suit was properly dismissed because the Florida Bar is protected by the doctrine of absolute immunity from suit for the performance of its disciplinary functions. Mueller v. The Florida Bar, 390 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1980); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392 (11th Cir. 1993); The Penthouse, Inc. v. Saba, 399 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1981). The Florida Bar asserts that because the District of Columbia grants absolute immunity to persons engaged in disciplinary functions, by fiat, the District of Columbia cannot exercise jurisdiction over appellant's suit against the Florida Bar for pursuing its disciplinary functions in the District of Columbia. See In re Nace, 490 A.2d 1120, 1124 (D.C. 1985) (noting that in the District of Columbia Bar Counsel has absolute immunity in disciplinary complaints); see Stanton v. Chase, 497 A.2d 1066, 1069 (D.C. 1985) (noting the same). We hold that the District of Columbia courts should, on principles of comity "as a matter of harmonious interstate relations," uphold the absolute immunity of the Florida Bar and its agents for conduct related to their performance of disciplinary functions, conducted in the District of Columbia, where equivalent District bar disciplinary agents would be entitled to such immunity in our courts. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979); Biscoe v. Arlington County, 238 U.S. App. D.C. 206, 211, 738 F.2d 1352, 1357 (1984) (noting that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State to resort to the laws of the defendant state to determine its amenability to suit); Schoberlein v. Purdue Univ., 544 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ill. 1989) (citing Hall, supra) (noting that no law requires the forum "State to apply another State's law concerning sovereign immunity if it would contravene the forum State's own legitimate public policy").
The seminal Supreme Court decision that addressed the issue of state immunity in the courts of a sister state was Nevada v. Hall
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