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Kawamata Farms Inc. v. United Agri Products12/11/1997
re, we hold that the superior court's ruling did not constitute prejudicial error.
Id. at 10 (original brackets omitted).
We agree with the Harned court that it is generally improper for counsel to refer to other verdicts during opening statements. The reference by the Plaintiffs' counsel to the Greenlight verdict was improper. Therefore, it was error for the circuit court to base its denial of the Liability Defendants' subsequent motion for a mistrial on its Conclusion that some issues in Greenlight were relevant to the instant case. However, "ordinarily a prevailing party's opening statement is not a ground for reversal unless the adversary's substantive rights have been prejudiced." Lussier v. Mau-Van Development, Inc., 4 Haw. App. 359, 394, 667 P.2d 804, 827 (1983) (citations omitted). In order to warrant a mistrial, the improper reference to the Greenlight verdict had to constitute an occurrence of such character and magnitude that it denied the Liability Defendants their right to a fair trial. Aga, 78 Haw. at 245, 891 P.2d at 1037.
As in Harned, the improper reference by the Plaintiffs' counsel to the verdict in Greenlight was extremely brief during the Plaintiffs' opening statement. Furthermore, the Liability Defendants do not claim that the Plaintiffs' counsel subsequently made any further references to the verdict in Greenlight during the remainder of the seven-month trial, which was much longer in duration than the one week trial in Harned.
The Plaintiffs also note that the circuit court instructed the jury throughout trial that the statements of counsel were not evidence. As a rule, we presume that the jury followed the circuit court's instructions. Knight, 80 Haw. at 327, 909 P.2d at 1142; Tawata, 79 Haw. at 21, 897 P.2d at 948.
Therefore, in light of the brevity of the improper reference to the Greenlight verdict by the Plaintiffs' counsel during his opening argument, the seven-month duration of the trial, the circuit court's instructions to the jury, and the overwhelming evidence in the record supporting the jury's verdict, we hold that, although it was improper for the Plaintiffs' counsel to refer to the verdict in Greenlight during opening statements, this reference did not constitute an occurrence of such character and magnitude that it denied the Liability Defendants their right to a fair trial. Aga, 78 Haw. at 245, 891 P.2d at 1037. Although we might not agree with all of the circuit court's reasoning in denying the Liability Defendants' motion for a mistrial, "where the circuit court's decision is correct, its Conclusion will not be disturbed on the ground that it gave the wrong reason for its ruling." Delos Reyes v. Kuboyama, 76 Haw. 137, 140, 870 P.2d 1281, 1284 (1994) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Liability Defendants' motion for a mistrial.
In summary, although the circuit court made some errors in the trial, such errors were harmless and insubstantial. We hold that the circuit court did not deny the Liability Defendants their constitutional right to a fair trial by: (1) sanctioning one of the Liability Defendants, DuPont, for its discovery misconduct by instructing the jury that it could consider DuPont's discovery misconduct in deciding the merits of the case; (2) denying the Liability Defendants' motions to realign the parties; and (3) denying the Liability Defendants' motion for a mistrial
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