 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
WAITS v. UNITED FIRE & CAS. CO.12/24/1997
ctice § 5071.45, at 102-03 (1981 & Supp. 1997) [hereinafter Appleman]. We interpret the statute, and hence UIM coverage, liberally to accomplish this objective. See, e.g., American States Ins. Co. v. Tollari, 362 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Iowa 1985) (adopting "broad coverage" view of underinsured motorist coverage and rejecting "narrow coverage" view); see also Appleman § 5071.45, at 104 (stating UIM statutes are interpreted liberally). This approach to the interpretation of UIM coverage is evident in our prior cases interpreting the phrase "legally entitled to recover." E.g., Wetherbee, 508 N.W.2d at 660; Leuchtenmacher, 461 N.W.2d at 294. These decisions show that our court has given this phrase a liberal interpretation, not a literal one.
In Wetherbee, we rejected a literal interpretation of the policy in favor of an interpretation more consistent with the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage as envisioned by the legislature. 508 N.W.2d at 660. In that case, we permitted the insured, the spouse of the deceased injured person, to [572 NW2d Page 574]
pursue a claim against her UIM carrier even though she was not the one authorized by statute to pursue the wrongful death claim, and in that sense, was not literally "legally entitled to recover" damages from the underinsured motorist. Id. at 661. We held it was sufficient that the insured "suffered damages caused by the fault of the underinsured motorist and entitled to receive those damages." Id.
Similarly, in Leuchtenmacher, we held an insured could settle with the underinsured motorist without jeopardizing his or her recovery of UIM benefits. 461 N.W.2d at 294. We concluded a judgment against the underinsured motorist was not required to establish that the insured was "legally entitled to recover" damages from the underinsured motorist. Id.
Both Wetherbee and Leuchtenmacher interpret the "legally-entitled-to-recover" requirement in a way that advances the legislature's purpose of compensating the injured party as if the underinsured motorist were adequately insured. This purpose is not furthered by a requirement that the underinsured motorist be liable to the injured party at the time the injured party seeks to recover UIM benefits. Therefore, we will not interpret the language, "legally entitled to recover," literally. We think this language is simply meant to limit UIM benefits to what the injured person would have been entitled to recover from the underinsured motorist if the underinsured motorist had been adequately insured and if a tort suit against the underinsured motorist had been pursued. See 3 Alan I. Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance § 34.1, at 106 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 1997).
The technical distinction between a covenant not to sue and a release has no relevancy to this interpretation of the phrase "legally entitled to recover." Under a release, the tort obligation is discharged; under a covenant not to sue, the obligation is not discharged, but the injured party agrees not to enforce that obligation. The goal of the parties and the practical result are the same: to preclude any further liability of the tortfeasor to the injured party. See 66 Am.Jur.2d Release § 2, at 679 (1973 & Supp. 1997) (noting the final result as between the parties to a covenant not to sue and a release "is the same"). Neither type of settlement precludes an insured from showing what damages he or she would have been entitled to recover from the underinsured motorist had a tort suit been pursued to judgment.
In conclusion, we give the phrase "legally entitled to recover" a liberal, not a literal, interpretation. It simply requires the insured to prove the damages he or she would
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Iowa Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|