LITZ v. ROBINSON12/4/1997
In this appeal, we are asked to review the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of two doctors. We affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
The following background is taken from the district court's order granting the doctors' motions for summary judgment:
The plaintiff, Frank Litz, is the husband of Dorothy L. Litz. He is appearing in this action pro se. Mrs. Litz was admitted to St. Luke's hospital on March 12, 1994
with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. She died on March 17, 1994. Mr. Litz alleges that the defendants breached their duties as physicians by wrongfully withholding life sustaining procedures.
Frank Litz was originally represented by counsel. Counsel was allowed to withdraw and Litz proceeded pro se. Richard J. Robinson, M.D. and Thomas J. Coffman, M.D. subsequently moved for summary judgment and submitted their own affidavits in support of their motions. Litz responded to the doctors' motions and submitted his own affidavit. The district court held a hearing on the motions on June 3, 1996, and, following argument, informed the parties that a written decision would be rendered. Litz subsequently submitted an affidavit of his daughter, Ilona Warden, on June 13, 1996. In its July 23, 1996, decision and order, the district court found that the doctors' motions were properly supported and that the burden was shifted to Litz to support his claim with expert testimony which satisfied the requirements of I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. The district court found that Litz failed to produce such expert testimony and granted the doctors' motions for summary judgment. Litz timely appealed, claiming that because his cause of action was based on a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 were inapplicable. Litz also asserts that I.C. § 39-4303 did not immunize the doctors from liability.
II.
DISCUSSION
We first note that pro se litigants are "held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 392, 797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990), quoting Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, 112 Idaho 1086, 1089 n. 5, 739 P.2d 385, 388 n. 5 (1987); Department of Law Enrorcement v. One 1990 Geo Metro, 126 Idaho 675, 681, 889 P.2d 109, 115 (Ct.App. 1995). Summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, we exercise free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct.App. 1986). When assessing the motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App. 1994).
Litz bases his arguments on appeal on his contention that his cause of action was a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The doctors, however, rebut Litz's contention and argue that Litz's claim, as pled in his complaint, was based on a claim of negligence. If Litz's claim was based on negligence, as the doctors contend, it is uncontroverted that Litz would have been required to comply with I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. See Maxwell v. Women's Clinic, P.A., 102 Idaho 53, 56, 625 P.2d 407, 410 (1981) (To preclude summary ju
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