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TETZLAFF v. BROOKS12/24/1997
provides, the prior act is not repealed.
122 Idaho 73, 78, 831 P.2d 541, 546 (1992), overruled on other grounds by Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 462, 886 P.2d 330, 338 (1994).
I.C. § 5-229 is not in conflict with either I.C. § 5-514 or § 49-2421. Although it is arguable whether these statutes relate to different subjects, we conclude that they have different objects and purposes. The object and purpose of I.C. § 5-229 is to toll statutes of limitations when the party against whom the claim is made is absent from the state. Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., 96 Idaho 723, 726, 536 P.2d 291, 294 (1975). The object and purpose of I.C. § 5-514 is to provide for jurisdiction in Idaho over any person who does any of certain enumerated acts. The object and purpose of I.C. § 49-2421 is to provide for service of process on the operator of a motor vehicle either personally or through the Secretary of State. Therefore, I.C. § 5-514 and § 49-2421 do not impliedly repeal I.C. § 5-229.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Tetzlaff asserts that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment. We disagree.
In Lipe, the Court ruled that the purpose of I.C. § 5-229 "was to prevent the running of the statute of limitations during the time that a defendant was unavailable for service of process because he was absent from the state. . . ." Id. at 726, 536 P.2d at 294. In Lipe, the Court considered the effect of the statute on the statute of limitations concerning a claim against a foreign corporation and concluded:
Excepting circumstances where the foreign corporation cannot be located for service of process with reasonably diligent efforts, the statute of limitations is not tolled against a foreign corporation which has not qualified to do business within the state during any period of time in which the corporation is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state and may be personally served without the boundaries of this state under the long arm statute.
Id.
In opposition to Brooks's motion for summary judgment, Tetzlaff made no effort to demonstrate that while Brooks was outside the state he could not have been located for service of process with reasonably diligent efforts. Therefore, the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment dismissing Tetzlaff's case. I.R.C.P. 56(c) ("The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.").
IV.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the summary judgment dismissing Tetzlaff's claim.
We award Brooks costs on appeal. Brooks did not request attorney fees.
TROUT, C.J., and SILAK, SCHROEDER and WALTERS, JJ., concur.
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