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Pryor v. Hoskins9/11/2002
tes its belief that the matter of acquaintance with members of Hoskins's family, membership in the same church, and a social connection "nearly reaches the level of constituting a challenge `for cause.'" Slip op. at 10. In my view, it may very well do so, but the matter of a bias against truck drivers is even more obvious as a cause for removal of the prospective juror.
With regard to the aspect of the peremptory challenge relating to the active church involvement of both Ivy and Hoskins, it is possible to read into that factor a racial overtone. To do so, however, would be to conclude that African-American churchgoers tend to be more involved than other races or that, if they are involved churchgoers, African-Americans bond with each other more closely than churchgoers of other races. Such a reading, however, would necessarily single out African-American churchgoers as a group separate and distinct from all other churchgoers in the larger community. Such a conclusion is neither rational nor factually supported.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled upon whether peremptory challenges based upon religious affiliation are akin to the prohibitions for race, gender, and ethnicity. State court decisions upon the matter are split. See generally Caroline R. Krivacka & Paul D. Krivacka, Annotation, Use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Persons from Criminal Jury Based on Religious Affiliation, 63 A.L.R. 5th 375 (1998).
In Thorson v. State, 721 So.2d 590 (Miss. 1998) for example, the Mississippi Supreme Court en banc, unanimously held that under state statutory and constitutional law, a peremptory challenge of two jurors based solely upon their membership in the Holiness faith was impermissible.
In State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), however, the court held that the Batson prohibition does not extend to peremptory challenges based upon religious affiliation. In Davis the challenge to an African-American juror was not premised upon race but rather upon membership in the Jehovah's Witness faith. In making the peremptory challenge the prosecutor stated that she always challenged members of the faith because they are reluctant to exercise authority over or sit in judgment of their fellow human beings. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed allowance of the peremptory challenge. One of the two dissenters, however, distinguished between exclusion of a prospective juror merely due to religious affiliation and exclusion of a prospective juror after questioning which would reflect that the juror's religion would interfere with her ability to act impartially. (The prosecutor had not followed up with questions to the jurors concerning their abilities to sit impartially).
I would not speculate upon what the Indiana Supreme Court might decide concerning a peremptory challenge whether based solely upon religion or based upon an arguably neutral ground albeit generated by religious affiliation and/or with possible racial overtones.
Be that as it may, in my estimation, Juror Ivy as a churchgoer was not a member of a sufficiently cognizable group as to trigger the equal protection provisions of the U. S. Constitution. As noted in 50A C.J.S., Juries, ยง 445 at 482:
"There is some authority for the view that, in order for a group to be cognizable, it is necessary that the group be definable and limited by some clearly identifiable factor; a common thread of attitudes, ideas, or experiences run through the group; and that a community of interests exists among the group's members . . . ." (footnote citations omitted).
The Hoskins objection to the peremptory challenge of Ivy with respect to the church affiliation aspe
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