 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Pryor v. Hoskins9/11/2002
s existed in Indiana for more than a century and a half. See, e.g., Wiley v. State, 4 Blackf. 458 (Ind. 1837) (citing R.C., 1831, p. 408, "forty-second section of the practice act" for the statutory right of "each party" in a civil case to make "peremptory challenge to three jurors"); and see current Ind. Code ยง 34-36-3-3 ("Each party in a civil case has three (3) peremptory challenges."). Primarily, " he function of the peremptory system is to eliminate extremes of partiality and to assure the parties that jurors will decide the issues on the basis of the evidence before them." Phillips v. State, 496 N.E.2d 87, 89 (Ind. 1986); see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). Initially, and as a general rule, a peremptory challenge may be "exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control." Swain, 380 U.S. at 220; see also Bond v. State, 273 Ind. 233, 403 N.E.2d 812, 816 (1980) ("peremptory challenge may be for no cause whatsoever"), and Indiana Metal Bed Co. v. Loge, 42 Ind. App. 461, 85 N.E. 979, 980 (1908).
A second consideration is applicable constitutional principles. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and "its progeny" limit the exercise of peremptory challenges in order to protect the constitutional right to equal protection under the law of both litigants and prospective jurors, "i.e., the right that a prospective juror will not be excluded from service on the basis of race or gender." Williams v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1372, 1377 (Ind. 1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1232 (1997). Such jurisprudence provides that when one litigant exercises a peremptory challenge to which the other party raises a Batson objection, the objecting party must then establish a prima facie case of the challenge having been racially discriminatory. See Ashabraner v. Bowers, 753 N.E.2d 662, 664 (Ind. 2001). If this case is made, the party who made the peremptory challenge then must "'come forward with a neutral explanation for [the challenge].'" Id. at 665 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97). "' f the explanation, on its face, is based on something other than race, the explanation will be deemed race neutral.'" Id. (quoting McCants v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ind. 1997)). Or, as the United States Supreme Court put it, a race-neutral explanation "means an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror." Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991).
Finally, we also must consider the trial court's broad discretion in managing the proceedings before it. See Williams, 669 N.E.2d at 1378. Keeping in mind the foregoing considerations, we now review the trial court's denial of the truckers' peremptory challenge of juror Ivy.
When the truckers sought to exercise their peremptory challenge as to both Bumpus and Ivy, Hoskins objected and argued that they were attempting to strike the only two black members of the jury panel in violation of Batson. Therefore, Hoskins established a prima facie case. See Ashabraner, 753 N.E.2d at 667. Consequently, the truckers were then required to provide a race-neutral reason for the challenge of Ivy. Id. at 665. The reason Hoskins argues on appeal as sustaining the trial court's determination to deny the peremptory challenge is that Ivy's church activities would lead her to identify with Hoskins. We find the truckers' explanation about the church-related activities of Ivy and Hoskins is "based on something other than race." See Ashabraner, 753 N.E.2d at 664. Likewise, we can find nothing in this reason that suggests a racially discriminatory basis for the challenge.
We are mindful that our supreme court has declared "the trial court's decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Indiana Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
By using the system, you agree to TERMS OF SERVICE
|