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Pryor v. Hoskins9/11/2002
" to be "a finding of fact which is accorded great deference." Williams, 669 N.E.2d at 1379 (citation omitted). However, as already noted, the reason given by the truckers for seeking to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike Ivy appears to be race-neutral on its face. Further, the record before us provides no argument by Hoskins to the trial court as to why the truckers' reason about Ivy's church involvement should be disbelieved and found to be pretext, masking a discriminatory intent for removing her from the jury. Nor did the trial court state any basis for why it was "not satisfied" that the truckers' reason for seeking to exercise a peremptory challenge as to Ivy was not race-neutral.
Having found the argued reason to be race-neutral, we now consider the weight of the truckers' stated reasons as a whole. The truckers had asserted two additional reasons to strike Ivy - Ivy's negative experiences with and attitude toward truckers, and her acquaintance with Hoskins' daughters at her church. These two reasons are so patently race-neutral that Hoskins does not even argue to the contrary on appeal. Moreover, that Ivy knew Hoskins' daughters, attended the same church as they attended, and had a social connection with the Hoskins family is a reason that nearly reaches the level of constituting a challenge "for cause." When we combine the two admittedly race-neutral reasons with the third church-involvement reason discussed above, we conclude that the truckers had indeed shown that their reasons for attempting to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike Ivy were not race-based.
We recognize the tension inherent in balancing the trial court's authority to manage the trials before it, the long history of the right to peremptory strikes granted by succeeding Indiana legislatures, and the principles of Batson and its progeny. Nevertheless, based upon the record before us, we conclude that in this case the trial court erred when it denied the truckers' peremptory strike of juror Ivy.
Because we find the trial court's failure to grant the truckers' peremptory strike of Ivy to be error, we must reverse. See Currin v. State, 669 N.E.2d 976, 979 (Ind. 1996). Accordingly, we remand for a new trial. Inasmuch as the other issues raised by the truckers may arise on retrial, we proceed to consider them.
2. Instruction and Verdict Forms
The truckers claim that the trial court erred by giving the jury Instruction #5 and only two verdict forms. Instruction #5 provides as follows:
You must decide this case on the basis of the Indiana law of comparative fault.
The term fault refers to varieties of conduct that make a person responsible, in some degree, for an injury . The type of fault at issue in this case is negligence. I will instruct you further concerning this type of fault.
You shall determine the percentage of fault of the plaintiff and the defendant. These percentages must total one hundred percent (100%).
If you find that the plaintiff's percentage of fault is greater than fifty percent (50%) of the total, then you shall return a verdict for the defendant, and no further deliberation of the jury is required.
If you find the plaintiff's percentage of fault is fifty percent (50%) or less of the total, you then shall determine the total amount of damage the plaintiff would be entitled to recover without regard to fault.
You shall then multiply that total amount of damages by the percentage of fault of the defendant and enter a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of the product of that multiplication. I have prepared verdict forms that will assist you in arriving at your verdict
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