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Bozman v. Bozman9/4/2002
e alleged and proved the type of outrageous, intentional conduct here alleged," id. at 358.
Then Chief Judge Gilbert, writing for this Court two years later in Linton, had this to say about the Court's decision in Lusby:
Maryland has steadfastly adhered to the common law doctrine of inter-spousal immunity in tort cases. Nevertheless, the Court, in Lusby [ ], recognized an exception to the doctrine whenever the tort committed against the spousal victim is not only intentional, as in assault and battery, but "outrageous," as where the errant spouse's conduct transcends common decency and accepted practices. The Court, in Lusby, was cognizant of the fact that there was no marital harmony that could be preserved by denying to the wife in that case the right to pursue civil remedies for the wrong done to her because the husband had effectively destroyed the marriage through his own atrocious misbehavior. Lusby represents a safe passage past the Rock ["of Gibraltar, guarding, as it were the sea of matrimony from an invasion by causes apt to alienate the spouses." 46 Md. App. at 661]. It is a limited way to be sure, but it is a small gap that heretofore did not exist. 46 Md. App. at 664 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Lusby was followed by Boblitz, decided by the Court of Appeals in 1983. The Court had before it a trial court's grant of summary judgment to the husband in his wife's suit against him alleging negligence in his operation of a motor vehicle that led to her suffering "serious, painful and permanent injuries." 296 Md. at 243. The Court took this opportunity to abrogate the common law of inter-spousal immunity in negligence cases.
Playing a part in the Court's decision, apparently, was the view held by a majority of the courts nationwide that the underpinnings of the doctrine found no place in modern society:
We share the view now held by the vast majority of American States that the inter-spousal immunity rule is unsound in the circumstances of modern life in such cases as the subject [case]. It is a vestige of the past. We are persuaded that the reasons asserted for its retention do not survive careful scrutiny. They furnish no reasonable basis for denial of recovery for tortious personal injury . We find no subsisting public policy that justifies retention of a judicially created immunity that would bar recovery for injured victims in such cases as the present. Id. at 273.
The Court was "mindful of the value of the doctrine of stare decisis and aware that for reasons of certainty and stability, changes in decisional doctrine ordinarily should be left to the Legislature." Id. The Court nevertheless concluded: "`We have never construed [the doctrine of stare decisis] to inhibit us from changing or modifying a common law rule by judicial decision where we find, in light of changed conditions or increased knowledge, that the rule has become unsound in the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to our people.'" Id. at 274 (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 459 (1983)).
The Court went on to hold in Boblitz that, in cases such as the one before it, "we have no legislative barrier to abrogation of this outmoded rule of law. Indeed, after legislative passage and approval by the people of Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights any ancient deprivation of rights based upon sex would contravene the basic law of this State." Id. at 274-75.
Cognizant of the Court of Appeals' decision in Lusby, and apparently influenced by the Court's subsequent opinion in Boblitz, this Court for some time entertained the notion that Lusby had abrogated the doctri
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