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Pappano v. Chevy Chase Bank8/30/2002
times the happening of the wrong, the knowledge of it and the maturation of the harm are simultaneous. When this occurs the recognition of the accrual of the cause of action is simple, when these elements happen sequentially it can become complex. Furthermore, there are nuances of difference in the accrual of the cause of action in cases arising out of actions ex contractu, as distinguished from actions ex delicto, and a further hybridization of actions arising out of professional malpractice and otherwise.
In Murphy v. Merzbacher, supra, the Court of Appeals expanded the discussion of the discovery rule in Harig v. Johns-Manville Corp. and noted that
he nature of some torts, however, belies this assumption [that a potential tort plaintiff is immediately aware of having been wronged]. Thus, when stealth, subterfuge, or other difficulties of detection leave a plaintiff "blamelessly ignorant" of the facts and circumstances legally entitling him or her to relief, the statute does not begin to run against the plaintiff, unless he or she knows, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of the wrong. Citations omitted. This so-called "discovery rule" is not so much an exception to the statute of limitations, as it is a recognition that the Legislature, in employing the word "accrues" in ยง 5-101, never intended to close our courts to plaintiffs inculpably unaware of their injuries. Murphy, supra, 346 Md. at 532 (internal citations omitted).
The discovery rule in Maryland's body of law was first enunciated in Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179 (1917), a medical malpractice case. In the ensuing years, the Court of Appeals extended the discovery rule to other cases in which professional malpractice was alleged. See e.g. Mattingly v. Hopkins, supra (civil engineers); Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price, 254 Md. 697 (1969)(attorneys); Feldman v. Granger, 255 Md. 288 (1969) (accountants). Ultimately, in Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631 (1981), the approach of incremental application of the discovery rule according to the business or profession of a defendant was abandoned. In that case, involving a suit by a homeowner against a building contractor, the Court of Appeals said that
aving already broken the barrier confining the discovery principle to professional malpractice, and sensing no valid reason why that rule's sweep should not be applied to prevent an injustice in other types of cases, we now hold the discovery rule to be applicable generally in all actions and the cause of action accrues when the claimant in fact knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. at 636.
In so ruling, the Court expressly abandoned any concept of implied notice as a basis for knowledge and held that,
ffirmatively speaking, we determine the discovery rule contemplates actual knowledge - that is express cognition, or awareness implied from knowledge of circumstances which ought to have put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry [thus charging the individual] with notice of all facts which such an investigation would in all probability have disclosed if it had been properly pursued. Id. at 637 (quoting Fertita v. Bay Shore Dev. Corp., 252 Md. 393, 402 (1969) (quoting Blondell v. Turover, 195 Md. 251, 257 (1950)).
With that background, we turn to the facts of the present case and, in so doing, we construe inferences of fact in favor of appellant as the non-moving party. We know that suit was filed on December 17, 1999; therefore, if the triggering event occurred more than three years earlier, the claim is time-barred. As we have noted, the question is -when did her cause of action accrue?
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