 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Pappano v. Chevy Chase Bank8/30/2002
>
Appellees urge upon us alternatives as to when appellant was on inquiry notice as to any breach by the Bank or other appellees. It is their position that appellant was on notice, at the latest, as of the date of death of her husband, August 19, 1996, if not as early as the days following the closing, when they did not receive documentation of insurance coverage. As to the former, it is their position that the cause of action was barred absolutely by August 19, 1999. As to their alternative, appellees suggest in their brief, and at oral argument, that the failure of the Bank, or the insurers, to provide documentation was sufficient to put appellant on notice. Were we to accept that position, limitations would have run even before the death of Mr. Pappano. We reject any notion that lack of documentation at the time of closing put appellant on inquiry notice. She believed that insurance was properly applied for and provided and, in fact, paid a monthly premium for insurance coverage. To impute to her actual knowledge or express cognition that the anticipated coverage was not provided as requested is a leap that we are unwilling to take, given the facts of this case.
Appellant, on the other hand, argues that the mere fact of the death of appellant's husband on August 19, 1996, did not trigger the running of the statute. It is her position that the earliest time that she was put on inquiry notice was in the spring of 1997, when she made her initial inquiry of the Bank as to the existence of credit life insurance coverage and was told that the coverage was on her life, not her late husband's.
On the question of when appellant should have known that no insurance benefits were available upon the death of her husband, we find Jones v. Hyatt, 356 Md. 639 (1999), to be instructive. On July 25, 1985 Charles Jones and his wife were injured in a motor accident caused by one Smith while in the course of his employment with K&D;Auto, Inc. When notified of the Joneses claim, K&D;learned that it was not, in fact, insured, although it believed that liability insurance had been provided by Hyatt before July 25. On August 12, 1985, Hyatt informed Jones as to the lack of coverage for K&D; On June 21, 1989, the Joneses obtained judgment against Smith and K&D; On October 6, 1989, suit was filed against Hyatt by the Joneses' on a third party beneficiary theory. The circuit court denied relief to Hyatt on limitations grounds. This Court reversed in an unreported opinion. Certiorari was granted by the Court of Appeals. Jones v. Hyatt Insurance, 346 Md. 632 (1997). After distinguishing between a breach of an agreement to procure insurance coverage and breach of a condition of an issued policy of insurance, the Court held that "... the statute of limitations on the Joneses' ... cause of action in contract began to run as soon as Hyatt's failure to procure insurance of K&D;was discovered." Jones v. Hyatt, 356 Md. at 650 (emphasis supplied). Because there was no factual dispute as to when both K&D;and the Joneses learned of the non-existence of coverage, there was no issue of inquiry notice.
We agree with appellees that any breach, either of contract or a tort duty, by the Bank occurred at the date of closing of the home equity loan (or shortly thereafter) when the requested policy of insurance was not issued to the Pappanos. Because the question of the reasonableness of her actions is one of fact, a trier of fact could find, on the facts before us, that her cause of actions did not accrue until the spring of 1997 when she made inquiry of the Bank. Therefore, her suit, filed on December 17, 1999, was arguably filed within the applicable statute of limitations. We do not believe that faili
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
By using the system, you agree to TERMS OF SERVICE
|