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Chapman v. Kamara12/2/1997 th, his acts occurring prior to appointment have the same effect as those occurring after." (Emphasis added.) We do not read this language so broadly as to state that every act byaby a future personal represtantiverepresentative will necessarily be attributed to the estate. We hold only that Reverend Cole, as the future personal representative, was not incapable of authorizing Mr. Ford to appear on behalf of the Estate at the time of the friendly suit.
The Estate counters that the act of authorizing an appearance in the instant suit by Reverend Cole is not within the compass of Section(s) 6-105(a) and thus not binding upon the Estate because as a matter of law this act could not have been "in good faith." The Estate does not dispute that a personal representative has authority to settle claims against an estate pursuant to Estates and Trusts Section(s) 7-401. The asserted lack of good faith arises from the fact that Reverend Cole was a named plaintiff and the Estate was a named defendant, so that Reverend Cole was necessarily acting "in a `hostile' capacity in the friendly suit" and was, in effect, self-dealing. There is a certain incongruity in alleging a per se hostility between purportedly friendly parties, but even in spite of this we do not find such an act to be necessarily in bad faith. A similar argument was raised in Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hallowell, 94 Md. App. 444, 617 A.2d 1134 (1993), where a husband and wife agreed jointly to indemnify the State with regard to some payment bonds. The wife died thereafter, and the widower, prior to becoming the personal representative of his deceased wife's estate, entered into a forbearance agreement extending the statute of limitations for specific claims on the bonds. We ruled there that, as long as the extension of claims benefitted the estate, the fact that it also benefitted the husband did not render it "in bad faith." The argument of bad faith in the instant case is even weaker than the argument in Hallowell, because here the Estate does not attack the terms of the settlement but the mere authorization of appearance of counsel on its behalf. In other words, even if the consent judgment were a bad faith act by Reverend Cole, that would not entitle the Estate to a vacation of judgment at this stage, because it would not indicate a lack of personal jurisdiction over the Estate. Our concern here is only with authorization of an appearance of counsel. We find that Reverend Cole's authorization of appearance on behalf of the Estate benefitted the Estate by facilitating the resolution of certain contingent liabilities regarding injured minors who could not be bound to a conventional settlement agreement; therefore, we find that the authorization of appearance was not in bad faith.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS
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