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Chapman v. Kamara12/2/1997
of right and permissive intervention. With regard to intervention as of right, Maryland Rule 2-214(a) states, in pertinent part:
"Upon timely motion, a person shall be permitted to intervene in an action ... when the person claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and the person is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the ability to protect that interest unless it is adequately represented by existing parties."
"A party moving for intervention as of right must show four things: (1) the application for intervention must be timely;"
"(2) the applicant must have an interest in the subject matter of the action;"
"(3) the disposition of the action would at least potentially impair the applicant's ability to protect its interest; and"
"(4) the applicant's interest must be inadequately represented by existing parties." Pharmaceia ENI Diagnostics, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 85 Md. App. 555, 566, 584 A.2d 714 (1990); Hartford Ins. Co. v. Birdsong, 69 Md. App. 615, 622, 519 A.2d 219 (1987). Appellants do not question the timeliness of appellee's application or the inadequacy of representation by existing parties. Their appeal focuses primarily on the second prong (existence of an interest in the subject matter), but it also implicates the third prong (relevance of any disposition to the claimed interest). We will accordingly address both.
We will review the instant intervention order for error. WMATA argues that we should review for abuse of discretion, on the grounds that the lower court has some discretion to grant permissive interventions. Appellants conceded the abuse of discretion standard at oral argument, but we have some lingering doubts. WMATA moved to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 2-214(a) only; there was no motion for permissive intervention under subsection (b) in the alternative. The court's order granting the motion also relied exclusively on 2-214(a). We are aware of no precedent for affirming a Rule 2-214(a) grant on the alternate grounds of Rule 2-214(b), and we have some concerns that to do so would interfere in the as yet unexercised discretion of the lower court to deny a 2-214(b) motion. Furthermore, because we believe that the lower court was correct in ordering intervention as of right, we will forego ruling on the question of whether a more deferential standard of review may be warranted.
Our precedents on the sufficiency of an interest have tended to ask the question of whether the claimed interest "is essential to protect and ... is not otherwise protected." Shenk v. Maryland Dist. Sav. & Loan Co., 235 Md. 326, 326, 201 A.2d 498 (1964); Birdsong, 69 Md. App. at 626; see Citizens Coordinating Comm. on Friendship Heights, Inc. v. TKU Assocs., 276 Md. 705, 712, 351 A.2d 133 (1976). Just this year, however, in Montgomery County v. Bradford, 345 Md. 175, 197-98, 691 A.2d 1281 (1997), the Court of Appeals cautioned, "The phrases `essential to protect,' `essentiality of interest,' and `might be disadvantaged,' used in some of our cases ... do not of themselves constitute the legal standard to be applied." Rather, a moving party must "establish `an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action,' and further establish that it is `so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the ability to protect that interest.'" Id. at 198.
In Bradford, several plaintiff organizations sued the State Board of Education and some State officials in two different actions. The main thrust of each ac
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