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Chapman v. Kamara12/2/1997
erent from those of the declaratory judgment action, the Court of Appeals found a strong basis for intervention as of right. If appellees were to prevail here, the practical effect would be a reversal of the council's zoning action as applied to their property, and appellants would have lost the very right granted them by statute to contest the final result. The disposition of this case, then, which deals with a transaction in which appellants claim an interest, may as a practical matter impair or impede their ability to protect that interest.
276 Md. at 712. The Court did not make clear whether "that" interest is a zoning interest or a statutory appellate interest, but it is likely to have been intended to be a combination of the two.
In Stewart v. Tuli, 82 Md. App. 726, 573 A.2d 109 (1990), this Court reversed the circuit court's denial of a motion to intervene, relying in part upon the sufficiency of the interest alleged. Property sellers had nullified a contract of sale pursuant to a contingency clause after becoming dissatisfied with the financial information provided by the potential purchaser. The sellers then entered into a second contract of sale with another party. The first purchaser brought a suit for specific performance and the second purchasers sought to intervene. In such a situation, we found that the second purchasers "undoubtedly" had a sufficient interest in the subject matter.
In the instant case, we can find nothing speculative about the interest asserted by WMATA. As of the time of the motion to intervene (and as of this date, as well), all the necessary events had occurred to give WMATA a real interest in the motion to vacate judgment. A final judgment had already been entered against the Estate in a negligence suit. The Estate had already sued WMATA for negligence in a related action, and WMATA had already moved for summary judgment based on the existence of the prior judgment. As Maryland is a contributory negligence jurisdiction, the summary judgment motion apparently asserted a complete defense. The Estate had already moved to vacate the prior judgment, and the Federal court had yet to rule on the merits of the summary judgment motion, perhaps waiting to see if the motion to vacate would succeed. It is hard to imagine what further preparatory step could be taken to make WMATA's interest more palpable. The resolution of the motion to vacate would determine whether WMATA would have the opportunity to present this complete defense to suit. The fact that the Federal court may eventually deny the summary judgment motion does not render the interest speculative or moot the issue. Just as in TKU, WMATA had an interest in preventing the foreclosure of its opportunity to protect its legal interests in another forum. Appellant's argument to the contrary, that WMATA could not possibly have interest in a friendly suit to which it was not a party, is not true to our precedents. We find that WMATA's interest, therefore, was entirely sufficient, that it related to the subject of the action, and that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impede WMATA's ability to protect its interest. Intervention as of right was therefore warranted.
Appellants argue on policy grounds that to permit intervention here, where the asserted interest is a mere "possible collateral effect of a suit or judgment," would create a precedent that would make litigation more cumbersome, more protracted, and less conducive to settlements. We do not agree. Appellants err in failing to recognize the rarity of the present situation and the resulting narrowness of the present holding. Prior to the entry of a final judgment against the Estate, WMATA could never have claimed a
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