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Angerhofer v. Stai9/17/2002
Nancy Ann Angerhofer appeals from the district court's dismissal of her personal injury action against respondent Darrick Bradley Stai. She argues that the court abused its discretion when it dismissed her action for failure to prosecute but never ordered the parties to trial, as required for a dismissal under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(a) (involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute or violation of court order). Because the district court dismissed this case for violation of court orders, not for failure to prosecute, and because the court did not abuse its discretion in doing so, we affirm.
DECISION
A district court's dismissal of a claim with prejudice is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Firoved v. Gen. Motors Co., 277 Minn. 278, 283, 152 N.W.2d 364, 368 (1967). Such a dismissal is a severe remedy and should be granted only under exceptional circumstances. Id.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing her case with prejudice because the matter had not yet been called for trial. As support for her position, she cites caselaw that holds that before a court can dismiss for failure to prosecute, "it must call the case for trial." Minn. Humane Soc'y v. Minn. Federated Humane Societies, 611 N.W.2d 587, 590 (Minn. App. 2000). Appellant correctly points out that her case was stricken from the trial calendar on May 15, 2001, and was never rescheduled prior to dismissal.
Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(a), a court "may upon its own initiative, or upon motion of a party, and upon such notice as it may prescribe, dismiss an action or claim for failure to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of the court." (Emphasis added.) Rule 41.02 is "designed to let the trial court manage its docket and eliminate delays and obstructionist tactics by use of the sanction of dismissal." Lampert Lumber Co. v. Joyce, 405 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Minn. 1987).
The district court struck appellant's case from the calendar at a pre-trial conference on May 15, 2001, after appellant requested a continuance, the second since her case had been filed. The court denied her request for a continuance, but indicated that it would dismiss the case without prejudice to give appellant six months to obtain counsel; appellant agreed to dismissal rather than proceed to trial pro se. The court's May 15, 2001 order provided that appellant "may re-file a complaint * * * within six months (by Nov. 15, 2001)" but that " he complaint will be deemed dismissed with prejudice after that date."
Although appellant obtained new counsel in October 2001 and served respondent with a new complaint on November 3, 2001, she did not file her complaint with the district court by the November 15, 2001 deadline. The court administrator thus treated the complaint as "dismissed with prejudice as of November 15, 2001, since no new complaint had been filed."
In denying appellant's request for leave to re-file her complaint, the district court reasoned:
[Appellant] had over a year from the time of her first attorney's withdrawal [in November 2000] to retain another attorney. The Court accommodated [appellant's] request for a continuance in November of 2000 and then [in May 2001] again gave [appellant] another six months to retain counsel before the complaint was dismissed with prejudice in November of 2001. The Court has allowed every opportunity for [appellant's] claim to be heard on its merits, but [appellant] has repeatedly waited until the eve of trial to request more time and now asks the court to allow scheduling of her case a third time after the November 15, 2001 deadline has passed. It is [appellant's] burden to
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