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Brockman v. Beacon Sports Bar & Grill9/10/2002 Cal. Rptr. 268, 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (holding chain of causation sufficient to find original tortfeasor responsible for blood infection contracted while plaintiff was hospitalized for accident-related surgery); Weems v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 526 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Iowa App. 1994) (holding that district court did not err in refusing to instruct on intervening cause when epidural block administered for back pain caused rare complication of spinal meningitis).
We recognize that evidence of an intervening, superseding act will break the chain of causation, insulating a defendant's negligence as a direct cause of the plaintiff's injury . Lennon v. Pieper, 411 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn. App. 1987). An intervening cause may be considered superseding if: (1) its harmful effects occurred after the original negligence; (2) it was not brought about by the original negligence; (3) it actively worked to bring about a result which would not otherwise have followed from the original negligence; and (4) it was not reasonably foreseeable by the original wrongdoer. Canada, 567 N.W.2d at 507. See, e.g., Oltmans v. Orthopaedic and Fracture Clinic, P.A., 278 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Minn. 1979) (holding that it was not error to submit jury instruction on superseding cause when plaintiff, after undergoing surgery, left hospital with no signs of infection and was later readmitted with staphylococcus infection, and x-rays showed osteomyelitis). The issue of an intervening, superseding cause has not been raised in this case.
Finally, we note that the district court primarily relied on Lewellin v. Huber, 465 N.W.2d 62 (Minn. 1991), to grant summary judgment for the liquor licensee. But Lewellin's requirement of a more direct and immediate proximate cause involved an interpretation of the dog-bite statute that imposes absolute liability on the dog owner. 465 N.W.2d at 65-66. Courts have not imposed a similar limitation on proximate cause in connection with civil-damage actions. See, e.g., Kryzer, 494 N.W.2d at 36.
The evidence in this case is sufficient to create a jury issue on proximate cause. The evidence establishes that, at the time of the surgery, Brockman was an otherwise healthy, 25-year-old man. It is undisputed that the surgery was a reasonable and necessary procedure to treat injuries sustained in the car accident. The medical evidence supports a claim that the administration of anesthesia was responsible for triggering the circulatory arrest. On these facts, the evidence is sufficient to create a triable issue on proximate cause, it was therefore error to grant summary judgment on that issue.
In connection with this appeal, Beacon Sports Bar also moved to strike two medical records contained in appellant's appendix on the grounds that these medical records were never submitted to the trial court. With respect to the first medical record, we deny the motion because this medical record was indeed contained in the trial court file, having been submitted by Beacon Sports Bar in connection with an earlier motion to compel discovery. The second medical record has not been considered in reaching this decision.
Reversed and remanded.
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