 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Collins v. Hertenstein9/3/2002
ces together." Bhagvandoss v. Beiersdorf, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Mo. banc 1987). Indeed, Rule 66.01(b) says:
When civil actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the civil actions; it may order all the civil actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Collins' case against each officer involved common questions of law and fact. The officers assert, however, that they should have had separate trials because they all fired their weapons at Wilson for different reasons, so the jury should have had an opportunity to evaluate their reasons separately. The circuit court gave separate instructions to the jury on the issue of liability for compensatory damages for each officer.
The jury had to determine whether or not each officer intentionally shot Wilson, used more force than was reasonably necessary, and directly caused or contributed to cause Wilson's death. The officers' giving different reasons for shooting Wilson does not show that the circuit court abused its discretion in not ordering separate trials. The evidence would not have been any different in separate trials. We do not see how the officers were prejudiced by the joint trial and how separate trials would have avoided prejudice or would have been conducive to expedition and economy. In fact, separate trials would not have been conducive to expedition and economy.
The officers also contend that the verdict against Thomas is proof that the jury did not treat the officers individually because, as the circuit court found by granting Thomas' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, no evidence existed that Thomas caused or contributed to Wilson's death.
Given our conclusion that the circuit court erred in granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict against Thomas, we are not persuaded by the officers' contention. The officers next contend that the circuit court abused its discretion when it refused to give the jury an instruction defining the term "reasonable force." The court instructed the jury:
On the claim of plaintiff Valerie Collins for compensatory damages for the wrongful death of Timothy Wilson against defendant [insert officer's name], your verdict must be for plaintiff Valerie Collins if you believe:
First, defendant [insert officer's name] intentionally shot Timothy Wilson, and
Second, defendant [insert officer's name] thereby used more force than was reasonably necessary, and
Third, defendant [insert officer's name] thereby directly caused or directly contributed to cause the death of Timothy Wilson.
This instruction was based on MAI 23.02, MAI 19.01, and Illustration 35.19. The decision to submit a definitional instruction is an issue involving the circuit court's discretion. DeWitt v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 667 S.W.2d 700, 711 (Mo. banc 1984). MAI 23.02's notes require that, if a battery arises out of a claim that a police officer used excessive force in his official duties, the court must instruct the jury to consider whether or not the officer used more force than was reasonably necessary. MAI 23.02 does not contain a definition of reasonably necessary or reasonable force. "When MAI does not require definition of the terms, definition is not required and may be an impermissible deviation." Hoodenpyle v. Schneider Bailey, Inc., 748 S.W.2d 683, 687 (Mo. App. 1988).
We, therefore, do not discern that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to define reasona
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Missouri Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|