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Pinnell v. Bates9/5/2002
a "reversal of the trend." I suppose that changes in the laws of over half of the states is not indicia of the movement.
. Some of the states that have abolished the classifications altogether are as follows: Webb v. City and Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1977) (superseded in part by statute as explained in Alaska v. Shanti, 835 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Alaska 1992)); Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (superseded in part by statute as explained in Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65, 71-72 (Cal. 1998)); Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445 (Haw. 1969); Keller by Keller v. Mols, 472 N.E.2d 161 (Ill.App.Ct.1984) (abolishing with respect to children only); Sheets v. Ritt, Ritt & Ritt, Inc., 581 N.W.2d 602 (Iowa 1998); Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Co-op., Inc., 328 So.2d 367 (La. 1976); Limberhand v. Big Ditch Co., 706 P.2d 491 (Mont. 1985); Moody v. Manny's Auto Repair, 871 P.2d 935 (Nev. 1994); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631 (N.H. 1976); Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868 (N.Y. 1976); Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882, 866-67 (N.C. 1998).
. Some of the states abrogating the licensee/invitee distinction and/or implementing the reasonableness standard while maintaining the trespasser classification are: Smith v. Arbaugh's Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wood v. Camp, 284 So.2d 691, 696 (Fla. 1973) ("eliminat the distinction between commercial (business or public) visitors and social guests upon the premises, applying to both the single standard of reasonable care under the circumstances"); Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303 (Kan. 1994); Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846 (Me.1979); Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973); Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972); Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51 (Neb. 1996); Ford v. Board of County Comm'rs of the County of Dona Ana, 879 P.2d 766 (N.M. 1994); O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D.1977); Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056 (R.I.1994); Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn.1984); Mallett v. Pickens, 522 S.E.2d 436 (W.Va. 1999); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 236 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1975); Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293 (Wyo.1993).
. Like the incoming tide, the evolution of the law cannot be denied.
. Moreover, the majority forgets that this Court, not the Legislature, adopted these distinctions years ago. In fact, the Legislature has continually declined to address this subject. If these distinctions were created by statute, then it would be for the Legislature to address. However, these distinctions were created by this Court as a tool for interpreting and applying our negligence principles. Through our inherent powers, we created these classifications which no longer serve their intended purpose. Through our inherent powers, we can abolish them. Therefore, I would reverse the grant of summary judgment on the licensee basis and remand with instruction that the case be tried before a jury applying the reasonable person in like circumstances standard.
. Accordingly, I dissent.
DIAZ AND GRAVES, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.
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