 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Rausch v. State Compensation Insurance Fund9/5/2002
ny entitlement to benefits not otherwise created in the Workers' Compensation Act. Again, I agree with the Workers' Compensation Court.
It is not altogether clear whether this Court has determined directly that the Workers' Compensation Court erred in its statutory analysis of §§§§ 39-71-710 and 39-71-737, MCA, since its opinion does not expressly address those analyses. Instead of doing so, the Court moves to a "final consideration" as a necessary part of its "statutory analysis," and accepts the claimants' argument that to disallow an impairment award to permanently totally disabled claimants, when such an award is statutorily provided to permanently partially disabled claimants, "would lead to an absurd result, and contravene the intent underlying the Workers' Compensation Act." The Court offers no authority in this regard, but relies on Johnson for the general principle that " hen more than one interpretation is possible, we will reject an interpretation that leads to an unreasonable result in favor of another that will lead to a reasonable result." It is my view that the Court errs in these regards.
First, the Court does not state how "more than one interpretation is possible" of the statutes and language at issue here. While it observes that impairment awards are "recognized" in §§§§ 39-71-710 and 39-71-737, MCA, that observation does not explain how "recognition" of the existence of impairment awards elsewhere in the Workers' Compensation Act properly results in a determination that some statute provides an entitlement to an impairment award. Our first rule in ascertaining legislative intent is to construe the plain language of the statutes at issue. See, e.g., Langemo v. Montana Rail Link, Inc., 2001 MT 273, 22, 307 Mont. 293, 22, 38 P.3d 782, 22 (citations omitted). The plain language of these statutes does not support the Court's implicit determination that more than one interpretation is possible here under any ordinary rules of statutory construction.
Nor do I believe the Court's somewhat blithe statement that the result produced by a proper statutory analysis would be "unreasonable and cannot have been the Legislature's intent"--without any legal analysis--is sufficient to create a right to an impairment award when no statute does so. The job of courts "is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance" contained in a statute, "not to insert what has been omitted. . . ." Section 1-2-101, MCA. The Court here is inserting into a purely statutory scheme an entitlement to a right not provided therein. I cannot agree.
I would affirm the Workers' Compensation Court's conclusion that these permanently totally disabled claimants are not legally entitled to an impairment award in addition to their other benefits.
KARLA M. GRAY
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Montana Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|