Phillips v. Warren9/3/2002
scretion, was not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees to that point. Therefore, the total judgment ultimately obtained by the Plaintiff for the purposes of considering Defendant's Rule 68 Offer of Judgment was the jury verdict plus recoverable costs, for a grand total of $6,205. Said Judgment ultimately obtained is less than the $8,000 Offer of Judgment filed by the Defendant on August 3, 1999, and therefore pursuant to Rule 68 the Defendant is entitled to recover its costs incurred subsequent to the Offer of Judgment of August 3, 1999.
15. As evidenced by the Affidavit of Jonathan E. Hall, which is before the Court for its consideration, Defendant incurred a total of $1,580.35 in costs following the Offer of Judgment of August 3, 1999. The Court hereby finds, in its discretion, that all costs incurred by the Defendant were reasonable and recoverable costs incurred during the course of defending against Plaintiff's claims. The Court therefore, in its discretion, hereby ALLOWS Defendant's Motion for Costs pursuant to Rule 68 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, in the amount of $1,580.35.
Thus, plaintiff's recovery was $4,624.65 ($6,205.00 less defendant's costs of $1,580.35).
INTEREST
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in assessing prejudgment interest under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-5(b) by failing to grant interest for the entire period between the commencement of the suit and the entry of final judgment.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-5(b) states:
In an action other than contract, any portion of a money judgment designated by the fact finder as compensatory damages bears interest from the date the action is commenced until the judgment is satisfied. Id.
As we said above, we note the entire verdict in this case consisted of compensatory damages.
In Brown v. Flowe, our Supreme Court said of § 24-5(b) that " e have held that the probable intent of the prejudgment interest statute, section 24-5, is threefold: (1) to compensate plaintiffs for loss of the use of their money, (2) to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant by having money he should not have, and (3) to promote settlement." Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 524, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998).
Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to prejudgment interest of $613.00 running from 12 July 1999 to 20 October 2000, the date of the trial court's final order. Defendant contends, and the trial court apparently ruled, that their Offer of Judgment, submitted on 3 August 1999, tolled the accrual of prejudgment interest. In support of this argument, defendant cites a line of cases which hold that the accrual of interest is tolled when defendant makes "a `valid tender of payment for the full amount [of plaintiff's claim], plus interest to date[.]'" Members Interior Construction v. Leader Construction Co., 124 N.C. App. 121, 125, 476 S.E.2d 399, 403 (1996), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 754, 485 S.E.2d 56 (1997) (quoting Thompson-Arthur Paving Co. v. Lincoln Battleground Assoc., 95 N.C. App. 270, 282, 382 S.E.2d 817, 824 (1989)). See also Webb v. McKeel, 144 N.C. App. 381, 384, 551 S.E.2d 440, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 371, 557 S.E.2d 537 (2001); Ingold v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 230 N.C. 142, 52 S.E.2d 366 (1949); Duke v. Pugh, 218 N.C. 580, 581, 11 S.E.2d 868, 869 (1940). Defendant claims that he made a valid tender of payment for the full amount of the plaintiff's claim, including any accumulated interest, when he filed the 3 August 1999 offer of judgment. Essentially, defendant asks this Court to hold that as a general rule, Rule 68 offers of judgment toll the accrual of prejudgment interest.
A defendant who makes an offer o
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 North Carolina Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|