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Romero v. Valencia County9/24/2002
, equipment or furnishings."
The County seeks to avoid this result arguing that Section 41-4-6 is inapplicable. It argues that the more specific section is Section 41-4-8, which waives immunity for the negligence of public employees "in the operation of the following public utilities and services: gas; electricity; water; solid or liquid waste collection or disposal; heating; and ground transportation."
Building on its premise that Section 41-4-8 is the more specific statute, the County argues that Section 41-4-8 grants immunity for design defects. The County argues that Section 41-4-8 is more narrow than Section 41-4-6 because Section 41-4-6 waives immunity for "operation or maintenance," while Section 41-4-8 waives immunity only for "operation." The County relies on this difference to argue that we should not extend our holding in Williams to Section 41-4-8. Because Section 41-4-8 does not waive immunity for negligent "maintenance," the County argues that the legislature intended to make counties immune for "design defects" involving any utility listed in that section.
The County is correct that the more specific section of the Act governs. See Bybee v. City of Albuquerque, 120 N.M. 17, 18-21, 896 P.2d 1164, 1165-68 (1995) (determining which section of the Act was more specific in Bybee). It is also true, however, that a statute is read in its entirety and each part is construed with every other part to achieve a harmonious whole, if possible. State ex rel. Klineline v. Blackhurst, 106 N.M. 732, 735, 749 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1988). When interpreting a statute, our goal is to determine legislative intent. See Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 121 N.M. 764, 768, 918 P.2d 350, 354 (1996).
We are not persuaded that Section 41-4-8 is the more specific section here. Granted, it waives immunity for the "operation" of "solid or liquid waste collection or disposal," but Section 41-4-6 is equally or more applicable because it deals with the "operation or maintenance of any building, . . . machinery, equipment or furnishings." The two sections are not in conflict and can easily be harmonized.
Section 41-4-6 covers injuries occurring on public premises, resulting from negligent operation or maintenance of buildings, machinery, equipment or furnishings, even if the premises are part of the utilities listed in Section 41-4-8. Section 41-4-8 covers other aspects of the operation of the utilities listed in that section; aspects other than negligent maintenance of "any building, . . . machinery, equipment or furnishings" that are part of the utility. See, e.g., Holiday Mgmt. Co. v. City of Santa Fe, 94 N.M. 368, 368-70, 610 P.2d 1197, 1197-99 (1980) (discussing liability under Section 41-4-8 for negligent operation of a sewer line connecting to private property). Harmonizing the two sections in this way explains why it was unnecessary for Section 41-4-8 to mention "maintenance."
Turning to the factual allegations in the complaint, we are satisfied that they state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The complaint alleges injury caused by the negligence of public employees in the operation or maintenance of public property. The "operation or maintenance" aspect of Section 41-4-6 includes negligence in failing to correct a dangerous condition created when the property was constructed or created from a design defect. As alleged in the complaint, the transfer station platform comes within the "buildings, . . . machinery, equipment or furnishings" aspect of Section 41-4-6. Thus, the action may proceed under Section 41-4-6 because, under the logical and reasonable reach of Williams, the County is not immune from suit.
CONCLUSION
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