 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Wilson v. Red Roof Inns12/11/1997
BR>
The record reflects that originally the trial court permitted appellant to obtain from appellee any reports of incidents involving bathtub injuries at appellee's facilities over a period of many years. As a result, appellant assembled an appendix containing copies of at least 210 incident reports. Appellant filed this appendix both in her original and in the instant action.
Under the circumstances, appellant adequately demonstrated her allegation that appellee had notice some persons were slipping while exiting the bathtub/shower unit in appellee's motel rooms. Thus, the trial court's subsequent protective order did not affect her substantial right to litigate her claim. Huebner v. Miles, supra; cf., Rossman v. Rossman (1975), 47 Ohio App.2d 103.
Moreover, the trial court gave a valid reason for the protective order, viz., relevancy. Since the evidence appellant had assembled demonstrated appellee had notice of other injuries, that was no longer an issue in the case. Therefore, appellant's desire to pursue particular instances of injuries to other patrons in other motel room bathrooms was inappropriate. Drawl v. Cleveland Orthopedic Ctr., Inc., supra; Bland v. Graves (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 644.
The trial court thus erred neither in granting appellee's motion for a protective order nor in denying appellant's motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, appellant's second and third assignments of error are overruled.
Appellant's first assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE APPELLEE WHERE THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED THAT APPELLANT LOST HER FOOTING WHILE EXITING A BATHTUB AT ONE OF THE APPELLEE'S MOTELS, THAT APPELLEE EQUIPS ITS MOTEL ROOMS WITH BATHTUBS THAT HAVE ELEVATED BOTTOMS, THAT THE ELEVATION CAUSED APPELLANT TO LOSE HER FOOTING AND THAT NUMEROUS OTHER PATRONS HAVE BEEN INJURED WHILE ATTEMPTING TO ALIGHT FROM SAID BATHTUBS.
Appellant argues summary judgment for appellee was improper because genuine issues of material fact remain in this case concerning appellee's breach of its duty toward her.
Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that: (1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274, * Davis v. Loopco Industries, Inc. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 64.
As the moving party in this case, appellee had the burden of demonstrating there existed no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dresher v. Burt (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 280. A review of the record reveals appellee met its burden.
To establish a claim for negligence, appellant had to show three essential elements: (1) a duty or obligation on the part of appellees to protect her from injury ; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) an injury proximately resulting from that breach. Wellman v. East Ohio Gas Co. (1953), 160 Ohio St. 103, paragraph three of the syllabus; Jeffers v. Olexo (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 140, 142; Keister v. Park Centre Lanes (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 19.
It is well established that:
* The possessor of premises owes a duty to an invitee to exercise ordinary or reasonable care for his or her safety and protection. This duty in
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Ohio Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|