 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Britt v. State9/26/2002
he opportunity to confer with counsel about the options available to him; the extent of advice from counsel and the court concerning the charges against him; and the reasons for his decision to plead guilty, including a desire to avoid a greater penalty that might result from a jury trial. Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993).
As previously stated, we conclude that the Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel, and therefore we conclude that the Petitioner was adequately informed when he entered his plea. Not only did counsel inform the Petitioner of potential pitfalls were he to proceed to trial, but the trial court also informed the Petitioner at the plea proceeding that "if [he pled] guilty to the attempt to commit rape of a child [charges], probably [would be required] to serve most of that sentence without being released on release eligibility date." At the conclusion of the post-conviction hearing, the trial court found that the Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel and that he therefore entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The evidence contained in the record before us does not preponderate against that finding.
C. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
Finally, the Petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence that the victim recanted the allegations against him. However, as the State correctly points out, newly discovered evidence is not generally an appropriate ground for relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. See William H. Necessary, Jr., v. State, No. 03C01-9601-CC-00009, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 246, at -18 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Mar. 16, 1999); Randy Hicks v. State, No. 03C01-9608-CR-00296, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 at -9 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Mar. 3, 1998). More specifically, this Court has held that "recanted testimony amounts to no more than a request to relitigate the sufficiency of the evidence at trial and is not a proper subject of post-conviction relief." Teresa Deion Smith Harris v. State, No. W2000-02611-CCA-R3-PC, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 604, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, June 13, 2001).
Furthermore, as previously noted, the trial court discredited the victim's recantation at the post-conviction hearing. The trial court also made the following findings concerning the victim's recantation:
[Counsel], in discussing the evidence, said that he asked prosecutor if . . . the victim . . . had retracted [the allegations against the Petitioner]. And his testimony was: When I was having that transcribed, . . . [the victim] had made the statement that she lied. That it did not happen.
It's just not newly discovered evidence. All of the things about her testimony, or potential testimony back then were known at this time. Nothing new has been discovered now. . . . When she . . . changed her mind and testified differently on several occasions about different things, put everybody on notice . . . that her testimony could be anything from very strong for conviction, to exoneration. But that was not a chance that anybody wanted to take.
We agree with these findings by the trial court.
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel and that he entered his pleas knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. We further conclude that the Petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.
|