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Lowrey v. Montgomery Kone3/26/2002
have a duty to exercise the "utmost" or "the highest degree of care" in the maintenance and operation of their vehicles and equipment. See Bethel v. New York City Transit Auth., 703 N.E.2d 1214, 1215 (N.Y. 1998). This doctrine dates back to "the age of steam railroads," whose "primitive safety features resulted in a phenomenal growth in railroad accident injuries." Id. at 1216. Rationales for the doctrine were (1) "the perceived ultrahazardous nature of the instrumentalities of public rapid transit," and (2) passengers' "total dependency upon [carriers] for safety precautions." Id. at 1217.
Although passenger elevators have long been classified among the group of common carriers, some courts have distinguished elevator owners and operators from elevator maintenance contractors and have declined to apply the common carrier doctrine to the latter. We need not dwell on the validity of this distinction, however, for we resolve this issue on a more fundamental ground. We uphold the trial court's refusal to apply the common carrier doctrine because we conclude that it adds no useful element to the ordinary negligence standard of reasonable care under the circumstances.
The New York Court of Appeals concluded in Bethel, after a thorough examination of the origins of the common carrier doctrine, that it retains no current viability. One underpinning from the steam railroad era -- the perception that the instrumentalities of public transport were ultrahazardous -- has been superseded, the court concluded, by more than a century of technological improvements and governmental regulation. 703 N.E.2d at 1216. Moreover, the dangers in any given mode of transport are wholly accommodated, and the passenger's dependence on the carrier for safety is likewise wholly accommodated, by the standard of reasonable care under the circumstances:
The objective, reasonable person standard in basic traditional negligence theory . . . necessarily takes into account the circumstances with which the actor was actually confronted . . ., including the reasonably perceivable risk and gravity of harm to others and any special relationship of dependency between the victim and the actor. 'The [reasonable person] standard provides sufficient flexibility, and leeway, to permit due allowance to be made . . . for all of the particular circumstances of the case which may reasonably affect the conduct required.'" Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts ยง 283 cmt. c).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals likewise recognized that the flexible standard of reasonable care under the circumstances accommodates whatever levels of care a particular set of dangers may require. Sebastian v. District of Columbia, 636 A.2d 958, 962 (D.C. 1994). Indeed, that court noted, even when cases "speak of the high degree of care required of a common carrier," such cases nonetheless subject common carriers "to essentially the same standard as any other alleged tortfeasor, i.e., an obligation to exercise due care." Id.; see also McReynolds v. First Office Mgmt., 948 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting notion that elevator owner/operator has duty to use anything greater than reasonable care to make the premises safe for use).
We find the reasoning of these cases persuasive. We also note that an attempt to explain the common carrier doctrine to a jury would be riddled with the prospect of confusion. A common carrier, like any other actor, must take reasonable care under the circumstances of the particular case. Just as the class of common carriers contains such disparate members as airplanes, taxis, horse-drawn carriages, and elevators, similarly the circumstances associated with each type of
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