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People v. Kozlowski3/4/2002
hey raised this issue in the trial court without success in their motion to set aside the kidnapping charges in the information.
On appeal, Kozlowski and Gatson couch this claim as one of statutory interpretation, arguing that because the applicable statute can reasonably be construed in the manner that they suggest, they are entitled to the benefit of any doubt about the meaning of its language. In 1999, section 209 made it a felony for " ny person who . . . kidnaps . . . another person . . . for ransom, reward or to commit extortion or to exact from another person any money or valuable thing, or any person [to aid or abet] any such act . . . ." (See former § 209, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 1997, ch. 817, § 2, italics added.) Courts interpreting this provision against similar challenges have concluded that kidnapping for extortion does not require that the person being extorted be someone other than the kidnap victim. (People v. Ibrahim (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1692, 1693, 1696-1698; see People v. Superior Court (Deardorf) (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 509, 513-514; People v. Preston (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 732, 735.) One court explained that because the statute was phrased in the disjunctive, it listed four different types of aggravated kidnapping: (1) for ransom, (2) for reward, (3) to commit extortion, and (4) to exact money or other valuables from another. Construing the statute's language, the court concluded that in only the last of these four types of aggravated kidnapping does the law require both a primary and a secondary victim. (People v. Ibrahim, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1696.)
In two other decisions, courts have suggested in dicta that even aggravated kidnapping for extortion is a two-victim crime involving a primary kidnap victim and a secondary extortion victim. (People v. Chacon, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 63 [kidnapping for ransom case]; People v. Martinez (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 579, 590-591, disapproved on another point in People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 628, fn. 10, cert. den. sub nom. Hayes v. California (1991) 502 U.S. 958; see People v. Ibrahim, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1696-1697 [rejecting this interpretation of Martinez].) Citing these cases, Kozlowski and Gatson reason that there are two conflicting lines of case law and argue that we should find the Chacon-Martinez cases more persuasive than Ibrahim. Like the Ibrahim court before us, we read the suggestions in Chacon and Martinez as dicta and decline to elevate them to law. Thus, we find no conflict in the case law. (See People v. Ibrahim, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 1697.) One may lawfully be convicted of kidnapping for extortion even if the kidnap victim and the extortion victim are the same person. (See, e.g., id. at pp. 1696-1698.)
C. Vagueness Challenge
In a related claim, Kozlowski and Gatson contend that former section 209-the kidnapping for extortion statute-is unconstitutionally vague as applied to them because the provision is ambiguous about whether a secondary extortion victim is required for the commission of this offense. They argue that the ambiguous statute did not give them adequate notice of the prohibited conduct. Their conduct was more like kidnapping for robbery than kidnapping for extortion, they reason. Thus, they conclude that their convictions of kidnapping for extortion violate their due process rights and must therefore be reversed. (See U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) Uncertain statutory language may pose vagueness issues raising due process concerns. (See In re Davis (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 645, 656 fn. 12.) However, in order to establish a due process issue, we must first find that the statute is ambiguous. We have already reject
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