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Means v. Baltimore County3/4/1997
Belcher experienced panic attacks, nightmares, and chest pains which were diagnosed as symptoms of PTSD. Id. at 713-14, 621 A.2d at 874-75.
This Court held that Belcher was entitled to workers' compensation for her injuries because they resulted from an accidental personal injury under the terms of the Act. We reasoned that when a mental injury is precipitated by an "unexpected and unforeseen event that occurs suddenly or violently," id. at 740, 621 A.2d at 887 (quoting Sparks v. Tulane Medical Ctr. Hosp. & Clinic, 546 So. 2d 138, 147 (La. 1989)), a worker may recover for that mental injury if the injury is "capable of objective determination." Id. at 746, 621 A.2d at 890.
One year later, this Court addressed the question of mental-mental claims in the context of occupational diseases. Davis v. Dynacorp, 336 Md. 226, 647 A.2d 446 (1994). Davis was a computer operator employed by Dyncorp. Davis alleged that he was continually subjected to serious harassment by his co-workers. The sustained harassment, Davis contended, caused PTSD which prevented him from returning to work. Id. at 228, 647 A.2d at 447. In contrast to Belcher, Davis maintained that he was entitled to compensation because he suffered an occupational disease, not an accidental personal injury .
This Court held that Davis's claim did not constitute an occupational disease under §§ 9-101(g) and 9-502(d)(1)(i) because
the alleged disease was not "due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist." § 9-502(d)(1)(i). We concluded that "nothing peculiar to Davis's duties as a computer operator . . . made him more susceptible to harassment than in any other kind of employment." Davis, 336 Md. at 237, 647 A.2d at 451.
Because Davis's particular claim could not constitute an occupational disease under the Act, we did not reach the issue of whether, as a matter of law, gradually resulting, purely mental diseases could ever be compensable occupational diseases. Id. at 238, 647 A.2d at 452. In conclusion, however, we addressed the possibility that gradually resulting mental diseases may be compensable occupational diseases. Judge Chasanow, writing for the Court, observed:
We are not willing to rule out the possibility that some gradually resulting, purely mental diseases could be compensable occupational diseases or that there may be circumstances where work-induced stress may result in a compensable occupational disease. Today, we merely hold that the mental disease resulting from the harassment encountered by Davis was not due to the nature of his employment.
Id. at 238-39, 647 A.2d at 452.
C.
This case requires us to resolve the issue that we did not reach in Davis, i.e., whether, as a matter of law, PTSD should be excluded from compensable occupational diseases. We reach this issue because, unlike the occupation of computer operator in Davis, the occupation of paramedic is "an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist." § 9-502(d)(1)(i). We hold today that PTSD may be compensable as an occupational disease under the Workers' Compensation Act if the claimant can present sufficient evidence to meet the statutory requirements. See § 9-101(g) (disease must be contracted as the result of and in the course of employment and the disease must cause the employee to become incapacitated); § 9-502(d)(1)(i) (disease must be due to nature of an employment in which the hazards of the occupational disease exist).
In Davis, 336 Md. at 237, 647 A.2d at 451, we posed the question as follows:
The question becomes whether mental disease caused by his job harassment may be reas
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