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Owens v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado3/14/2002
. 510, 474 P.2d 622 (1970). However, no compensability exists when a later accident or injury occurs as the direct result of an independent intervening cause. Post Printing & Publishing Co. v. Erickson, 94 Colo. 382, 30 P.2d 327 (1934). Whether a particular condition is the result of an independent intervening cause is a question of fact for resolution by the ALJ. See Faulkner v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 12 P.3d 844 (Colo. App. 2000).
Here, it is undisputed that claimant's cancer occurred independently of the industrial injury and that the brachytherapy simply enabled her to utilize the more conservative lumpectomy procedure. Although claimant's permanent range of motion deficits in her upper extremities limited her treatment choices, it was the cancer, not her industrial injury, that actually created the need for the brachytherapy. The sole purpose of that protocol was to eradicate any spread of the cancer, not to avoid a possible aggravation of claimant's industrial injury or to otherwise alleviate symptoms related to it.
Claimant's reliance upon English v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 98 N.C. App. 466, 391 S.E.2d 499 (1990), as authority for compensability in this instance is misplaced. There, the claimant, who had sustained an industrial back injury , was advised to have cesarean section surgery because natural childbirth would further damage her back. The surgery was found to be a natural consequence of the industrial injury because it was necessary to avoid further injury to the claimant's weakened back, and, therefore, it was determined to be a compensable medical benefit.
Here, claimant concedes that the brachytherapy did not cure or relieve her industrial injury . Indeed, it had no effect on her industrial injury at all.
Claimant's cancer is totally independent of her industrial injury and needed to be treated notwithstanding the industrial injury. Thus, because the record supports the ALJ's determination that the cancer and its treatment are not "effects of" the industrial injury, we may not disturb that finding.
And, we agree with the Panel that ยง 8-42-101(1)(a) does not contemplate increased compensation for an original industrial injury when, as in this case, that injury merely impacts the treatment choices for an unrelated medical problem. In such a situation, the unrelated medical problem operates as an independent intervening cause. See Post Printing & Publishing Co. v. Erickson, supra.
The order denying the requested medical benefits is affirmed.
JUDGE ROTHENBERG and JUDGE KAPELKE concur.
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