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Perodeau v. City of Hartford3/26/2002
oyed. We recognize, however, that that does not mean that persons in the workplace should expect to be subject to conduct that ''transgress the bounds of socially tolerable behavior''; (internal quotation marks omitted) Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 243 Conn. 89; and that involves ''an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress ... that ... ifitwere caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.'' Montinieri v. Southern New England Telephone Co., supra, 175 Conn. 345. Nevertheless, for the following reasons, we conclude that, when the employment relationship is ongoing, the public policies enumerated in Jaworski v. Kiernan, supra, 241 Conn. 407, outweigh the interests of persons subject to such behavior in the workplace in being compensated for their emotional injuries.
First, in an ongoing employment relationship, employees who fear lawsuits by fellow employees may be less competitive with each other, may promote the interests of their employer less vigorously, may refrain from reporting the improper or even illegal conduct of fellow employees, may be less frank in performance evaluations, and may make employment decisions such as demotions, promotions and transfers on the basis of fear of suit rather than business needs and desires. All of this conduct would contribute to a less vigorous and less productive workplace. We conclude that such a pervasive chilling effect outweighs the safety interest of employees in being protected from negligent infliction of emotional distress. In cases involving a termination of employment, on the other hand, the employee can no longer use the threat of a lawsuit to influence the conduct of his employer and fellow employees.
Second, in light of the inherently competitive and stressful nature of the workplace and the difficulties surrounding proof of emotional distress, extending the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress to ongoing employment relationships would open the door to spurious claims. We recognize that the line that we draw in the present case is somewhat arbitrary. This court previously has been willing to draw lines limiting liability, however, when '' here are fears of flooding the courts with spurious and fraudulent claims; problems of proof of the damage suffered; exposing [potential defendants] to an endless number of claims; and economic burdens on industry.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31, 50-51, 675 A.2d 852 (1996); id., 51 (recognizing that limits that this court placed on cause of action for bystander emotional distress were ''somewhat arbitrary,'' but concluding that they were ''necessary in order not to leave the liability of a negligent defendant open to undue extension by the verdict of sympathetic juries'' [internal quotation marks omitted]). We conclude that, although the rule that we adopt in this case may allow some legitimate emotional injuries to go uncompensated, the social costs of allowing such claims would outweigh the social benefits.
With respect to the fourth Jaworski factor, the case law of our sister states, the approaches of the various jurisdictions may be divided into four general categories: (1) jurisdictions that categorically do not recognize the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress; (2) jurisdictions that categorically do not recognize such claims in the employment context; (3) jurisdictions holding that such claims are precluded by the respective state's workers' compensation scheme; and (4) the majority of jurisdictions that consider employmentrelated claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress on the basis of whether the claim meets the elements of the claim under the relevant state's law. Thus, the m
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