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Perodeau v. City of Hartford3/26/2002
idual defendants pursuant to § 46a-60; and his claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress as to all of the defendants. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss with respect to all claims except the claim against the individual defendants pursuant to § 46a-60 and the claim against the individual defendants for negligent infliction of emotional distress. With respect to those claims, the District Court recognized that this court has never considered whether § 46a-60 (a) (1) imposes liability on individual employees or whether individual employees may be held liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress for conduct arising in a continuing employment relationship. Accordingly, the District Court certified those questions to this court.
I.
We first consider whether § 46a-60 (a) (1) imposes liability on individual employees. The plaintiff contends that, because the term ''employer'' in § 46a-60 is defined in General Statues § 46a-51 (10) to encompass any ''person,'' which is defined in General Statutes § 46a-51 (14) to include an individual, an individual employee may be liable for violations of § 46a-60. This contention is contingent upon his claim that the phrase ''with three or more persons in his employ'' in § 46a-51 (10) modifies only the word ''employer'' and not the word ''person.'' We disagree.
Whether § 46a-60 (a) (1) imposes liability on individual employees is a matter of statutory interpretation ''over which this court's review is plenary. . . . In construing statutes, ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doyle v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 252 Conn. 79, 84, 743 A.2d 156 (1999).
We begin our analysis with a review of the relevant statutory provisions. Section 46a-60 (a) (1) provides in relevant part that '' t shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . or an employer, by himself or his agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against him in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's race, color, religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disorder, mental retardation, learning disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to blindness . . . .'' General Statutes § 46a-51 (10) provides that the term '' ' mployer' includes the state and all political subdivisions thereof and means any person or employer with three or more persons in his employ . . . .'' General Statutes § 46a-51 (14) provides in relevant part that the term '' ' erson' means one or more individuals ....''
''In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language . . . .'' General Statutes § 1-1 (a). ''To ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, it is appropriate to look to the dictionary definition of the term.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rivera, 250 Conn. 188, 200 n.12, 736 A.2d 790 (1999). The dictionary defines the word ''employer'' to mean '' ne who employs, esp. for wages or salary . . . .'' Webster's New I
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