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Perodeau v. City of Hartford3/26/2002
g negligent infliction of emotional distress claim without prejudice to plaintiff to replead so as to exclude injuries for which act provides remedy); but see Gregory v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 896 F. Sup. 78, 84 (D. Conn. 1994) (claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is precluded by act); Vorvis v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 821 F. Sup. 851, 856 (D. Conn. 1993) (same). Likewise, a number of Connecticut courts have determined that tort actions for non-compensable emotional injuries are not barred by the act. See Karanda v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 98582025S (May 10, 1999) (24 Conn. L. Rptr. 521) (employee may bring common-law tort action against employer for mental or emotional impairment arising out of and in course of employment that does not arise from physical injury or occupational disease); Carr v. Devereux Foundation, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 950067464 (September 6, 1995) (same); Stepney v. Devereux Foundation, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 0065885 (July 17, 1995) (14 Conn. L. Rptr. 483) (same); Silva v. Stop & Shop Cos., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 920295633 (January 12, 1993) (same); cf. Fulco v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 27 Conn. App. 800, 807-809, 609 A.2d 1034 (1992), appeal dismissed, 226 Conn. 404, 627 A.2d 931 (1993) (claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of termination not barred by act because termination does not arise out of employment).
In Stepney v. Devereux Foundation, supra, 14 Conn. L. Rptr. 485, the trial court reasoned that '' he Workers' Compensation Act compromises an employee's right to a common-law tort action for work-related injuries in return for relatively quick and certain compensation. . . . When an injury is expressly excluded from coverage under the act, the employe 's right to pursue a common-law remedy for the injury is no longer compromised. The exclusivity provided by the workers' compensation statute is a quid pro quo, and a right of action should only be deemed taken away from an employee where something of value has been put in its place.'' (Citation omitted.) We agree with this reasoning. Accordingly, we conclude that the act itself does not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a common-law tort claim against the individual defendants for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
B.
We now consider the merits of the second certified question, namely, whether individual municipal employees may be found liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of actions or omissions occurring within the context of a continuing employment relationship, as distinguished from actions or omissions occurring in the context of termination of employment. We conclude that they may not.
We begin our analysis with a review of our case law pertaining to claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context. In Montinieri v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 175 Conn. 337, 345, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978), this court recognized for the first time that ''recovery for unintentionally-caused emotional distress does not depend on proof of either an ensuing physical injury or a risk of harm from physical impact.'' We concluded, rather, that, in such cases, ''the defendant would not be liable unless the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.'' Id.
In Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200
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