 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Kamaunu v. Kaaea3/28/2002
ns' requirements of the Local Rule which . . . it interpreted as requiring that . . . a monetary settlement offer should have been made." 68 F.3d at 897. Disagreeing with the district court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held:
Although we applaud the district court's efforts to encourage and facilitate settlements, we conclude, as also discussed infra, that it abused its discretion by interpreting the rule to require, for this action, making a settlement offer as part of a good-faith effort to settle.
Obviously, there is no meaningful difference between coercion of an offer and coercion of a settlement: if a party is forced to make a settlement offer because of the threat of sanctions, and the offer is accepted, a settlement has been achieved through coercion. Such a result cannot be tolerated. . . .
Early settlement of cases is an extremely laudable goal, which federal judges have considerable power to encourage and facilitate, . . . and which is essential to controlling the overcrowded dockets of our courts. And, we commend the district court for its concern for protecting pro se plaintiffs' (particularly pro se prisoners') rights. On the other hand, as the district court acknowledged, parties may have valid and principled reasons for not wishing to settle particular cases. These reasons may not be based necessarily on the merits of a particular case, or the party's possible exposure in it, but because of the effect that a settlement might have on other pending or threatened litigation.
Here, two of the Government's numerous (and, it seems, very valid) reasons for not making a monetary offer were because [the plaintiff] was . . . a pro se prisoner who had not shown much interest in prosecuting his claims, and because of the concomitant (and most legitimate) concern that settlement might encourage other prisoners to file frivolous lawsuits in the hopes of recovering a "nuisance value" settlement. It goes without saying that courts, among other entities, provide recourse for pro se prisoners, just as they do for other litigants; but, a plaintiff's status as a prisoner, pro se or otherwise, is a legitimate factor for the opposing party to consider in determining whether to make a settlement offer. In light of the increasing flood of prisoner litigation that threatens to submerge our courts, such a factor is extremely relevant, especially when the Government is the defendant and the taxpayers will be footing the bill for any settlement. Id. at 897-98.
In Henry v. Prusak, 582 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the entry of a default against the owner and driver of a vehicle "solely on the basis of a nonparty insurance carrier's refusal to make a settlement offer" deprived the owner and driver of "due process, the right to assert a defense, and the right to have a jury determine any disputed issues of fact." Id. at 196. The court reasoned as follows:
A court cannot "force" settlements upon parties. The practical effect of [the trial judge's] sanction of default against a party whose insurance carrier's representative refuses to make an offer to pay money is to force settlement. While we certainly encourage settlement negotiations as an essential and necessary tool for the resolution of disputes and docket control in congested courts, we cannot tolerate the routine practice of entering a default against a party for failure of the party's insurance carrier to make an offer of settlement. Id. (citation omitted).
In Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawaii 494, 513, 880 P.2d 169, 191 (1994), the Hawaii Supreme Court recognized that the imposition of sanctions under HAR Rule
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Hawaii Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|