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Brooks v. Holtz3/13/2002
We note Instruction No. 21, the marshalling instruction on product liability, informed the jury of plaintiffs' burden to prove the product was used "in the intended manner or in a manner reasonably foreseeable by Defendant Lester. . ." (emphasis supplied). When read together with the marshalling instruction, we believe the court's use of the Uniform Instruction defining defectiveness sufficiently informed the jury of the applicable law. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.
V. Jury Access to Videotape.
Randy Brooks's brother and son prepared a videotape which plaintiffs claim documented the broken and defective condition of the spacer. The videotape was received in evidence and was shown to the jury during the trial. Plaintiffs assert the district court erred in refusing to send the tape to the jury room for the jury's use during deliberations. We disagree. The district court is vested with considerable discretion to decide whether the jury should have access to exhibits during deliberations. See State v. Baumann, 236 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Iowa 1975); Mongar v. Barnard, 248 Iowa 899, 910, 82 N.W.2d 765, 773 (1957). Depositions are generally excluded from the jury room because of the risk that testimony contained in them might be overemphasized to the exclusion of other evidence. Baumann, 236 N.W.2d at 366. We conclude the information in the videotape might similarly have been overemphasized by the jury. Accordingly, we find the district court did not err in excluding the videotape from the jury room and affirm on this issue.
VI. Court's Communication with Jury.
On Friday, October 13, 2000, the case was submitted to the jury at approximately 3:30 p.m. At 4:28 p.m., the court summoned the jurors to the courtroom and informed them of his plan to send them home for the weekend. One of the jurors informed the court of schedule conflicts that would make it difficult for her to resume deliberations on the following Monday; and another juror asked the court if there was any reason why the jury could not return to the jury room and continue their deliberations. At 4:33 p.m., the court permitted the jury to resume their deliberations. The jury returned a verdict at 4:53 p.m. the same day.
Plaintiffs contend these communications between the district court and the jury constitute reversible error. We disagree. We first note that the conversation was between the court and all jurors. Moreover, the communications were reported and their entire subject matter was directly related to proper administrative matters. Under the circumstances of this case, no possibility of prejudice to plaintiffs from the communications is evidenced in the record. See Ragee v. Archbold Ladder Co., 471 N.W.2d 794, 796-97 (Iowa 1991) (holding conversation between judge and jury did not warrant new trial as it was reported and between entire jury); State v. Atwood, 602 N.W.2d 775, 778 (Iowa 1999) (declining to adopt a per se rule mandating any communications between judge and jury as reversible error). Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.
VII. Duration of Jury Deliberations.
Plaintiffs next contend the short duration of the jury's deliberations "might well be an indication that the jury felt that the Judge had some attitude about the case that might have affected the results." We find no evidence of such a judicial attitude in the record. Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that the duration of jury deliberations in this case is a ground for reversal and therefore have waived error. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)(c). Accordingly, we find no reversible error on this issue.
AFFIRMED.
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