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Brister v. Geico Insurance3/28/2002
unning directly in favor of third-party claimants and alternatively argued that the statute provides a cause of action only for violations of the specific acts listed. Noting that the second sentence of Subsection A, by its own wording, applied to both insureds and "claimants," the court stated:
We have no trouble concluding that the legislature intended to provide a right of action directly in favor of third-party claimants in certain situations when it enacted La. R.S. 22:1220. We are unwilling to suppose that the legislature failed to understand the distinction between "insureds" and "claimants" when it enacted La. R.S. 22:1220. (footnote omitted). Theriot, 694 So.2d at 188. Based on this conclusion, a third-party claimant such as Brister may have a right of action against GEICO. The question remains as to whether he has a cause of action.
Proceeding to the insurer's alternative argument in Theriot that the cause of action is limited to the violations of the specific acts listed, the court examined the wording of Subsection B of the statute and stated that:
here, as here, the legislature lists specific prohibited acts, and couples that list with a concomitant scienter requirement, those acts and those alone are the intended targets of the damages and penalties provided. The specification that "any one of the following acts" constitutes a breach suggests that other acts do not fall within the parameters of this statute. Theriot, 694 So.2d at 188. Therefore, at least with reference to any claims under the statute, Brister would have to allege a violation of one of the listed duties. Under the facts of this case, none of those are applicable.
Brister argues, however, that his claim against GEICO is not premised solely on the duties imposed by Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1220, but rests also on broader tort principles embodied in Louisiana Civil Code article 2315. However, the Theriot court addressed these traditional concepts also, stating that before the enactment of this statute:
Our courts had never awarded damages or penalties for alleged "[bad faith] settlement practices" in favor of third-party claimants against insurers under statutory law or under general tort or contract principles. (citations omitted). Theriot, 694 So.2d at 188-89.
Explaining further, the court said:
The relationship between the insurer and third-party claimant is neither fiduciary nor contractual; it is fundamentally adversarial. For that reason, a cause of action directly in favor of a third-party claimant against a tort-feasor's insurer is not generally recognized absent statutory creation. (footnote omitted). Theriot, 694 So.2d at 193.
Brister has not pointed out to this court, nor has our research disclosed, any other statutory provisions that would create a cause of action directly in his favor against GEICO under the facts of this case. Therefore, we conclude that the grounds of the objection of prescription cannot be removed by amendment of the petition, because regardless of when he discovered the improper settlement of his claim, Brister has no cause of action against GEICO as a result of its participation in that settlement. Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing his claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court dismissing Brister's claims against GEICO is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against Brister.
AFFIRMED.
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