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Terrace Land Development Corp. v. Seeligson & Jordan3/19/2002
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Our Supreme Court, as part of its analysis, stated:
Since Perin [v Peuler (On Rehearing), 373 Mich 531; 130 NW2d 4 (1964)], this Court, again without any apparent consideration of the meaning of "practice and procedure" as stated in [Const 1963,] art 6, ยง 5, has reaffirmed Perin's broad statement of our authority over all matters relating to the admission of evidence. See, e.g., People v Mitchell, 402 Mich 506; 265 NW2d 163 (1978); People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323; 217 NW2d 22 (1974); Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 474; 189 NW2d 202 (1971). [McDougall, supra at 29 (emphasis added).]
The McDougall Court further ruled that " o the extent that this Court's prior decision in Perin and its progeny suggest that all statutes affecting the admission of evidence are procedural, they are overruled." Id. at 32.
The McDougall decision did not overrule the Buscaino Court's determination that MCL 600.5856 applies to cases where a prior lawsuit was involved between the parties, nor did it overrule the determination that the date of filing a complaint measured the time frame upon which to determine whether the statute of limitations barred a claim. The Buscaino decision did not involve a conflict between the court rule and MCL 600.5856 because the statute was not applicable. At most, McDougall simply overruled the language in Buscaino, which touched on the Perin decision, to which the Buscaino Court cited in support of its position that pursuant to the Michigan Constitution, the Legislature must defer to the Michigan Supreme Court on the matter regarding when an action is commenced for purposes of the statute of limitations. Ultimately, however, Buscaino was not decided on those grounds because MCL 600.5856 was not in conflict with the court rule or applicable to the case. In McDougall, supra at 24, the Supreme Court noted that it is not necessary to determine whether a statute is a legislative attempt to supplant the Court's authority where there is no inherent conflict with a court rule.
Any question as to the effect of McDougall on Buscaino, in regards to the date a court must look to in general in addressing a statute of limitations defense, was answered by our Supreme Court in Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547, 552 n 3; 607 NW2d 711 (2000), wherein the Court stated:
In general, of course, a statute of limitations requires only that a complaint be filed within the limitation period. Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 474, 481; 189 NW2d 202 (1971), partially overruled on other grounds, McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15; 597 NW2d 148 (1999).
Here, plaintiffs' complaint was filed within the two-year limitation period.
V. CONCLUSION
Because plaintiffs' action was never dismissed and re-filed, MCL 600.5856 has no application to this case, in that, there is no "tolling" issue. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs complied with the limitations period by filing their complaint pursuant to MCR 2.101(B) within two years of the termination of the attorney-client relationship, and the fact of subsequent placement of process with an officer and service of the complaint after the limitation period can in no way result in the action being time-barred.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
William B. Murphy
David H. Sawyer
Joel P. Hoekstra
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