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Florence v. Hatfield Used Cars3/1/2002
Secretary of State, and this act was held to constitute the transfer of title.
Further, in Gazdecki v Cargill, 28 Mich App 128, 131; 183 NW2d 805 (1970), this Court held that legal title does not pass upon mere delivery of the automobile and that the purchaser of the vehicle must sign the applications and other necessary documents to enable the dealer to secure the transfer of title. Lastly, this Court's opinion in Messer v Averill, 28 Mich App 62; 183 NW2d 802 (1970), is also factually similar. In Messer, defendant Averill purchased on automobile on June 8, 1966, was involved in an accident on June 17, 1966, and the application for new title was made with the Secretary of State on June 18, 1966. This Court initially noted that MCL 257.233 provides for the transfer of ownership of a vehicle and that this statute must be followed to transfer title to a vehicle. This Court specifically held that title was not transferred until June 18, 1966, when the dealer made the application for new title to the Secretary of State. See Messer, supra, p 64-65.
We hold that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of Hatfield Used Cars because the trial court erred in using the date of the sale (May 13, 1998) as being the date of execution. The Supreme Court made clear in Goins that the application for title is executed when it is sent to the Secretary of State, not when delivery of the vehicle is effectuated. In the present case, although the vehicle was sold to Dzon on May 13, 1998, and he took possession of the vehicle on that date, the undisputed evidence shows that the application for title was not executed until May 18, 1998, when Davis delivered the forms to the Secretary of State. Moreover, even accepting Davis' affidavit as true that Dzon signed the application for title on May 13, 1998, that date is not dispositive with regard to execution of the application for title. Here, the execution of the application for title occurred on May 18, 1998, three days after the accident.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of defendant Hatfield Used Cars because the undisputed facts of the case show that execution of the application for title occurred on May 18, 1998, three days after the accident occurred. Therefore, Hatfield Used Cars was an "owner" of the vehicle involved in the accident within the meaning of the Vehicle Code. Because there is no material factual dispute with regard to when the execution of the application for title occurred, we agree with plaintiff that she is entitled to summary disposition as a matter of law with respect to the question of Hatfield Used Car's ownership of the vehicle. We reverse the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of Hatfield Used Cars, remand for entry of summary disposition in favor of plaintiff with respect to Hatfield Used Car's ownership of the vehicle and for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is not retained.
Kathleen Jansen
Brian K. Zahra
Patrick M. Meter
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