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Mitchell v. Glimm3/26/2002
exclude evidence that one of the defendant's expert witnesses owned a fractional interest in a consulting company that derived a relatively small portion of its revenue by consulting with the insurance carrier that provided liability coverage to Glimm. The trial court enjoys substantial discretion in controlling the flow of evidence during trial. Church of God Pentecostal, Inc. v. Freewill Pentecostal Church of God, Inc., 716 So. 2d 200, 210 ( ) (Miss. 1998). The court's decision that, whatever probative value this evidence might have had, it was outweighed by the prejudice that would have arisen by interjection of the existence of insurance coverage into the trial was one, in my view, within the range of discretion afforded the trial court. While it may be true, as the majority suggests, that today's average juror is sophisticated enough to suspect the existence of liability insurance, that does nothing to change the fact that, as to the issues presented to the jury for consideration, the question of insurance has no relevance. In that situation, I would conclude that the trial court's ruling to exclude this rather limited financial connection between the expert and the defendant's insurance carrier as tending to show bias of the witness was a reasonable application of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403, which permits the trial court to exclude evidence that has some relevance "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of the issues . . . ." M.R.E. 403.
. I would affirm the jury verdict and resulting judgment.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., JOINS THIS SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. IRVING, J., CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART:
. I agree with the majority's holding that this case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial because Mitchell was not allowed to present evidence to the jury of the financial connection of Glimm's expert to Glimm's liability insurance carrier. However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the case should be reversed because the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Rather, I agree with the dissent, authored by Chief Judge McMillin, that the jury heard sufficient conflicting evidence upon which it could conclude that Mitchell did not suffer, in the accident in question, any of the injuries complained of. I agree with the remaining portions of the majority opinion.
BRIDGES, J., JOINS THIS SEPARATE OPINION.
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