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Griswold v. Itegon General Insuarance Corp.3/19/2002
N.C. 482, 495-96, 467 S.E.2d 34, 42 (1996). This language pertains only to UM/UIM coverage, and does not carry over into the liability coverage realm.
With this in mind, the Haight Court noted that the exclusion was a vehicle-oriented exclusion "in that it limits liability coverage to personal injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the covered vehicle." Haight, 132 N.C. App. at 679, 514 S.E.2d at 106. This being so, it saw "no reason to invalidate the exclusion as repugnant to the [Financial Responsibility] Act." Id.
In contrast, our Supreme Court dealt with an owned vehicle exclusion similar to Exclusion B.1.a before this Court in the context of UIM coverage in Mabe, 342 N.C. 482, 467 S.E.2d 34. The Supreme Court had previously decided that the owned vehicle exclusion in UM motorist coverage was against the public policy of the Financial Responsibility Act in Bray v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 341 N.C. 678, 462 S.E.2d 650 (1995). The Mabe Court, reiterating that UM/UIM coverage follows the person rather than the vehicle, held that an exclusion "which purports to deny UIM coverage to a family member injured while in a family-owned vehicle not listed in the policy" is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the Financial Responsibility Act. Mabe, 342 N.C. at 495, 467 S.E.2d at 41.
Exclusion B.1.a in the case sub judice is of the Haight variety "in that it limits liability coverage to personal injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the covered vehicle." It does not deal with UM/UIM coverage. As did the Haight Court, we see no reason to invalidate the exclusion. We find that the exclusion is clear, unambiguous and not contrary to public policy. Therefore, the New South policy provides no coverage to Ted and Teresa Helms even if plaintiffs prove the applicability of the family purpose doctrine and the son's negligence is imputed to the parents. Thus, the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment to plaintiffs' and denying partial summary judgment to defendants and the order is reversed as to those parts.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Judge CAMPBELL concurs.
Judge GREENE concurs in the result with separate opinion.
GREENE, Judge, concurring in the result.
The trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with regard to insurance coverage by New South Insurance Company (New South) for Wesley Philips' negligence. As Plaintiffs did not appeal from that determination, the correctness of that ruling is not before this Court. Accordingly, I would not address the issue discussed in part A of the majority opinion.
With respect to the order of the trial court that the New South policy provides coverage to Teresa and Ted Helms if they are held liable under the family purpose doctrine, I agree the trial court must be reversed. As noted by the majority, the policy excludes coverage for "the ownership, maintenance or use of . . . ny vehicle, other than your covered auto, which is . . . owned by you." The "covered" autos in the New South policy were a 1992 Chevrolet and a 1995 Honda. The 1989 Pontiac operated by Wesley Philips at the time of the accident, although owned by Teresa and Ted Helms, was not a covered auto under the New South policy. Plaintiffs do not argue in their briefs to this Court that the New South policy, as read by this Court, contravenes the purposes of the Financial Responsibility Act and thus must be construed so as to provide coverage. Accordingly, I would not address that issue.
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