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Layman v. Woo3/19/1997
Francis E. Sweeney, Sr., J.
In this case, we are asked to determine whether ODHS has a right of subrogation against defendants in a medical malpractice lawsuit for Medicaid benefits it expended on behalf of an injured plaintiff.
Appellants contend that R.C. 2305.27 prohibits ODHS from recovering Medicaid benefits from a defendant found negligent in a medical malpractice lawsuit. R.C. 2305.27, which has since been repealed by 1996 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, provided:
"Except as provided in section 2743.02 of the Revised Code, in any medical claim, as defined in division (D) of section 2305.11 of the Revised Code, an award of damages shall not be reduced by insurance proceeds or payments or other benefits paid under any insurance policy or contract where the premium or cost of such insurance policy or contract was paid either by or for the person who has obtained the award, or by his employer, or both, or by direct payments from his employer, but shall be reduced by any collateral recovery for medical and hospital care, custodial care or rehabilitation services, and loss of earned income. Unless otherwise expressly provided by statute, a collateral source of indemnity shall not be subrogated to the claimant against a physician, podiatrist, or hospital." (Emphasis added.)
Appellee ODHS concedes that R.C. 2305.27 bars some subrogation. However, in relying upon the last sentence of R.C. 2305.27, appellee argues that there masbe statutory exceptions to the general rule that collateral sources not be subrogated. Appellee maintains that R.C. 5101.58 is such an exception to R.C. 2305.27. R.C. 5101.58 states:
"The acceptance of aid pursuant to Chapter 5107., 5111., or 5115. of the Revised Code gives a right of subrogation to the department of human services of any county against the liability of a third party for the cost of medical services and care arising out of injury, disease, or disability of the recipient. *"
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that unless a different intention appears in a statute, words in a statute shall be construed in their ordinary and natural meaning to effectuate the intent of the legislature. State ex rel. Gareau v. Stillman (1969), 18 Ohio St.2d 63, 47 O.O.2d 187, 247 N.E.2d 461. Thus, when construing a statute, "none of the language employed therein should be disregarded *." Carter v. Youngstown Div. of Water (1946), 146 Ohio St. 203, 32 O.O.184, 65 N.E.2d 63, paragraph one of the syllabus.
In applying these principles of statutory construction, we find that R.C. 2305.27 permits subrogation against a physician, podiatrist, or hospital if a statute expressly provides for a right of subrogation. The inclusion of the words " nless otherwise expressly provided by statute" in R.C. 2305.27 reveals that the legislature intended that there could be statutory exceptions to the statute's bar against subrogation. R.C. 5101.58 is a statute which "otherwise expressly provide " for a right to subrogation to a department of human services. Therefore, R.C. 5101.58 is an exception to R.C. 2305.27.
Appellants, however, believe that these two statutes conflict and that R.C. 2305.27 prevails over R.C. 5101.58. In making this argument, appellants rely primarily upon the appellate court decision of Holaday v. Bethesda Hosp. (1986), 29 Ohio App.3d 347, 29 OBR 475, 505 N.E.2d 1003. In Holaday, ODHS sought reimbursement for medical services rendered to the plaintiff. The trial court held, in part, that the Ohio Department of Human Services may not be subrogated to a claimant against a physician, podiatrist or hospital. In reaching its determination, the court relied
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