Elliott v. Birth3/19/2002
trier of fact 'must be given the utmost consideration and deference before a jury's decision is to be set aside.' Id. at 505-06, 508 S.E.2d at 322 (quoting Smith v. Price, 315 N.C. 523, 530, 340 S.E.2d 408, 413 (1986)). See also Smith v. Beasley,298 N.C. 798, 259 S.E.2d 907 (1979) (jury's exclusive province to evaluate evidence, weigh credibility, and determine the facts).
However, the jury should not simply ignore or disregard undisputed evidence. Daum v. Lorick Enterprises, 105 N.C. App. 428, 432, 413 S.E.2d 559, 561, disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 383, 417 S.E.2d 789 (1992) (where jury awarded plaintiff nothing for pain and suffering, in the face of uncontradicted testimony, this Court holds that jury "arbitrarily ignored the evidence of plaintiff's pain and suffering and entered an inconsistent verdict not in accordance with the law"); Robertson v. Stanley, 285 N.C. 561, 566, 206 S.E.2d 190, 193 (1974) (new trial required where although "the evidence of pain and suffering clear, convincing and uncontradicted," the jury awarded plaintiff nothing for pain and suffering).
Thus, the trial court's discretionary power to set aside the verdict must be balanced against the jury's discretion to determine the facts of a case, and the trial court "is not free to set aside the verdict merely because the judge might have awarded a different amount of damages[.]" Vanwyk Textile Systems v. Zimmer Mach. Amer., 994 F.Supp. 350, 358 (W.D.N.C. 1997) (citation omitted). This Court, in Howard v. Mercer, 36 N.C. App. 67, 70-71, 243 S.E.2d 168, 170 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 305 N.C. 478, 290 S.E.2d 599 (1982), expressed it this way:
here, as here, the jury as primary fact- finder fixes a quantum, and the trial judge indicates his view that it is [erroneous,] . . . the judge's unique opportunity to consider the evidence . . . must be respected. But against his judgment we must consider that theagency to whom the Constitution allocates the fact-finding function in the first instance--the jury-- has evaluated the facts differently.
Finally, the trial court's ruling on a Rule 59 motion must have factual support in the record. Worthington, 305 N.C. 478, 290 S.E.2d 599 (trial court's award of new trial upheld where North Carolina Supreme Court concludes that record evidence provides factual support for judge's decision); Munie v. Tangle Oaks Corp., 109 N.C. App. 336, 427 S.E.2d 149 (1993) (trial court's decision to award new trial on damages reversed where court had reduced damage award to an amount that was not supported by the evidence); Daum 105 N.C. App. 428, 413 S.E.2d 559, disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 383, 417 S.E.2d 789 (1992) (trial court's denial of motion for new trial reversed where evidence showed that verdict was inconsistent and not rendered in accordance with the law).
In the instant case, defendant asserts that the findings upon which the trial court ordered a new trial are not supported by the record, and consequently do not support its conclusions of law. We agree.
The trial court's decision to grant a new trial was based upon the following findings: (1) that the jury's award of damages to plaintiff was inadequate; (2) that damages were "awarded under the influence of prejudice" against plaintiff's grandmother, because she was born in Austria, and still had a German accent, and; (3) that the jury disregarded the trial court's instructions to award plaintiff "one lump sum all of his injuries, both present and future." Trial evidence regarding damages included the following: Elliott testified that, although the hospital report described plaintiff as "alert, no distress and happy," that when he arrived at the hospital after the accident, pl
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