State ex rel. v. Crawford3/18/1997
Per Curiam.
Dannaher claims that the court of appeals erred by denying the requested writs of prohibition and mandamus. For the reasons that follow, we find that Dannaher's contentions are meritless and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Neither prohibition nor mandamus will lie where relator possesses an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Hunter v. Certain Judges of the Akron Mun. Court (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 45, 46, 641 N.E.2d 722, 723. Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court's jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal. State ex rel. Enyart v. O'Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110, 1112. But where a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause, prohibition and mandamus will issue to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions, notwithstanding the availability of appeal. State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 287, 289, 667 N.E.2d 929, 931; State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 161, 656 N.E.2d 1288, 1292.
Judge Crawford transferred the driveway case back to Perry County. Therefore, prohibition and mandamus will not issue to vacate the transfer order and compel Judge Crawford to proceed in the case unless Dannaher establishes a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Crawford to grant the Cobles' motion for change of venue.
In her first proposition of law, Dannaher asserts that Judge Crawford lacked jurisdiction to transfer the case back to Perry County due to the jurisdictional priority rule. The jurisdictional priority rule provides that "' s between [state] courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal whose power is first invoked by the institution of proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all tribunals, to adjudicate upon the whole issue and to settle the rights of the parties.'" State ex rel. Racing Guild of Ohio v. Morgan (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 54, 56, 17 OBR 45, 46, 476 N.E.2d 1060, 1062, quoting State ex rel. Phillips v. Polcar (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 279, 4 O.O.3d 445, 364 N.E.2d 33, syllabus.
Generally, "it is a condition of the operation of the state jurisdictional priority rule that the claims or causes of action be the same in both cases, and ' f the second case is not for the same cause of action, nor between the same parties, the former suit will not prevent the latter.'" State ex rel. Sellers v. Gerken (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 115, 117, 647 N.E.2d 807, 809, quoting State ex rel. Judson v. Spahr (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 111, 113, 515 N.E.2d 911, 913.
The gas-line and driveway cases involve different claims for relief. The gas-line case involved claims of trespass, ejectment, declaratory judgment, and breach of contract. The driveway case involved claims of interference with easement, nuisance, and equitable reformation. Further, the cases had different parties, with the gas-line case including Franklin County businesses not joined in the driveway case and the driveway case including certain Perry County residentswho were not parties to the gas-line case. Although the cases involved rights concerning the same general property, they concerned separate and distinct issues, one involving an ingress and egress easement and the other involving an alleged gas-line easement.
Based on the foregoing, the jurisdictional priority rule did
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