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Morris v. Copeland3/20/1997
This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgement to Bexar County and its sheriff, Harlon Copeland. Robert Scott Morris and his wife sued Bexar County and Copeland, in his official capacity as Bexar County Sheriff, asserting state-law claims and claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. These claims related to Morris' arrest and imprisonment based upon an indictment and capias issued by Bexar County naming him as the accused. The trial court granted a take-nothing summary judgement for appellees. The Morrises appeal by eighteen points of error. We affirm.
Ralph Sramek, a narcotics agent for the Texas Department of Public Safety, completed an undercover drug transaction with James Scott Morris. Afterwards, a Bexar County grand jury issued a true bill of indictment naming Robert Scott Morris, the plaintiff below, as the person involved in the drug transaction. The indictment alleged that on August 2, 1989, "Robert Scott Morris" delivered less than 28 grams of methamphetamine to Ralph Sramek. Bexar County issued a capias naming Morris as the person for arrest. Copeland's name appears on the capias, and a deputy signed it. On May 12, 1990, two Nueces County Precinct 8 deputy constables, acting on the capias, arrested Morris and took him to the Nueces County Jail. He was detained there and later released on $15,000 bail.
Morris and his wife sued Copeland, Bexar County, and other defendants for the alleged wrongful conduct relating to Morris' false arrest and imprisonment. They asserted state-law claims and violations of 42 U.S.C. Section(s) 1983.
Bexar County and Copeland filed a joint motion for summary judgment charging that sovereign immunity barred the suit. They also asserted that the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) excluded claims arising out of false arrest and imprisonment, claims for which the government entity did not receive written or actual notice, and claims for damages which were not covered by the use of tangible or real property. Copeland asserted that the Morrises could not sue him because he was not a governmental entity under section 101.001(2) of the TTCA. Regarding the Morrises' section 1983 claims, Bexar County and Copeland, in his official capacity, asserted that they were not liable under section 1983 because they had no policy or custom which authorized or approved any alleged acts of misconduct.
In their response to the summary judgement motion, the Morrises asserted that Bexar County and Copeland had received actual and written notice of their claim. They asserted that tangible property, that is, computers, vehicles, and police accessories, caused their injuries and that the intentional-tort exception to the TTCA's immunity waiver did not bar their claim. They alleged that Copeland was responsible for specific acts which caused their injury, that is, he signed the capias naming Morris as the person designated for arrest. They asserted that the warrant was not valid because it had expired. Further, they asserted that there were no procedures or policies in place to prevent the deprivation of personal liberty.
The trial court granted summary judgement for appellees without specifying the ground or grounds on which it relied. On December 16, 1994, the trial court signed an order which severed the Morrises' claims (negligence, violation of civil rights, 42 U.S.C. Section(s) 1983, false arrest & imprisonment, assault & battery, libel & slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and respondeat superior) against Copeland and Bexar County from the main action and made the severed action the subject of a separate suit. This appeal involves only Copeland and Bexar County.
Standard O
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