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Trevino v. Atchison3/13/1997
This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgement in favor of appellee, Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company ("Santa Fe"). In one point of error, appellants contend the summary judgement was improperly granted. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL STATUS
On September 11, 1992, Erica Trevino and her children, David Ray Trevino, Jr. and Vallerie Trevino, were killed after their car collided with a train at the 16th Street crossing in Abernathy, Texas. Anthony Trevino, also Ms. Trevino's child, suffered severe brain damage as a result of the collision. Santa Fe owned the tracks where the incident occurred.
In February 1993, appellants instituted this wrongful death action against Santa Fe under Texas law, alleging: (1) negligent failure to install adequate warning devices at the 16th Street crossing; and (2) negligent failure to warn persons that the train was approaching or passing over the crossing. Santa Fe moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgement in its favor. This appeal follows.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard we follow in reviewing a summary judgement is well established. The movant for summary judgement has the burden to show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, we treat evidence favorable to the non-movant as true, and we resolve any doubts in his favor. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co,. 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985); Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex. 1984).
Santa Fe moved for summary judgement on two grounds. First, Santa Fe claimed that federal law preempted appellants' state tort law claims. Alternatively, Santa Fe argued that appellants' claims were barred because it had no authority to modify or add warning devices at the 16th Street crossing. The judgement in favor of Santa Fe did not state the grounds upon which it was granted. Where, as here, a summary judgment does not specify the grounds upon which the trial court granted it, the reviewing court will affirm the judgement if any one of the theories advanced in the motion is meritorious. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993); Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989). In light of these considerations, we proceed with our review.
ANALYSIS
a. Federal Preemption
Appellants contend the trial court erred in granting Santa Fe's motion for summary judgement because their state law claims are not preempted by federal law. Both parties agree the disposition of this case is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in CSX Transp., Inc., v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S.Ct. 1732 (1993). In Easterwood, the Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff's Georgia state law claims were preempted by the Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), the Highway Safety Act of 1973, and a series of grade crossing regulations adopted by the Secretary of Transportation. The FRSA contains an express preemption clause which provides, in part:
"The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations, orders and standards relating to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject matter of such State requirement." 45 U.S.C. Section(s) 434 (1988) (emphasis added).
After analyzing 23 C.F.R. Section(s) 646.214(b)(3) and (4),
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