Strynar v. Rahill3/28/2002
tion to dismiss based upon the pleadings only." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the motion justice dismissed all of plaintiff's claims based on the exclusivity of the IOD statute for the injuries alleged. Although plaintiff alleged different common-law causes of action against defendants, they all related to the defendants' alleged improper handling of his claim for IOD benefits and to the personal injuries he allegedly suffered because of such conduct. Given that the IOD statute embodied plaintiff's exclusive remedy for all such claims, we are not convinced that the motion justice committed reversible error in dismissing the complaint in its entirety under these circumstances.
For these reasons, we deny the appeal and affirm the order dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Flanders, J., concurring.
For all the reasons set forth in my dissents in Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 262-71 (R.I. 1996), and in Hargreaves v. Jack, 750 A.2d 430, 436-38 (R.I. 2000), I still believe that Kaya was wrongly decided by this Court in 1996. Nevertheless, given that, in the six years since that ruling, the Legislature has not seen fit to correct this Court's exclusive-remedy gloss on how the IOD statute operates, the overarching principle of stare decisis causes me to acquiesce in that decision and to join in the Court's opinion in this case, even though I disagree on the merits with its underlying assumptions, its reasoning, and its conclusions. In doing so, I recognize that the doctrine of stare decisis "has more force in statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudication because, in the former situation, [the Legislature] can correct our mistakes through legislation." Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 695, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2038, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, 638 (1978). See Square D Co. v. Niagra Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424, 106 S.Ct. 1922, 1930-31, 90 L.Ed.2d 413, 426 (1986) (holding that, in the area of statutory construction, the legislature is capable of overruling the Court's interpretation of the statute, and therefore stare decisis is entitled to a strong presumption); see also NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, 473 U.S. 61, 84, 105 S.Ct. 3045, 3058, 87 L.Ed.2d 47, 64 (1985) ("we should follow the normal presumption of stare decisis in cases of statutory interpretation"); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 2069, 52 L.Ed.2d 707, 719 (1977) ("we must bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where [the Legislature] is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation"). (Emphasis added.)
Thus, given the passage of time since the Court decided Kaya, whether its IOD exclusivity doctrine "may be found within the statutory framework or was [as I believe] judicially engrafted thereon is of no concern. If the former, the statute remains substantially the same; if the latter, the construction is of such long standing as to warrant an assumption of legislative acquiescence." Colarusso v. Mills, 99 R.I. 409, 415, 208 A.2d 381, 385 (1965) (citing St. Germain v. Lapp, 72 R.I. 42, 48 A.2d 181, 166 A.L.R. 450 (1946)).
Justice Goldberg did not participate.
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