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Malinowski v. United Parcel Service3/11/2002
ing Tancrelle v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 756 A.2d 744, 748 (R.I. 2000)). In support of her argument for admission of the speed recording, plaintiff referred to the doctrine of spoliation. Specifically, plaintiff argued that UPS tampered with the tachograph apparatus such that "certain mechanisms necessary to establish the tachograph evidence were destroyed while in the possession of ." The trial justice declined to issue the instruction because "there was no explicit request made as to what evidence was the subject of an argument regarding spoliation."
"General Laws 1956 ยง 8-2-38 requires the trial justice to instruct the jury on the law to be applied to the issues raised by the parties." State v. Briggs, 787 A.2d 479, 486 (R.I. 2001) (quoting State v. Lynch, 770 A.2d 840, 846 (R.I. 2001)). However, the trial justice is not obligated to issue an instruction where the requesting party has failed to make clear its argument or present any evidence in support of its theory. See Morinville v. Old Colony Co-operative Newport National Bank, 522 A.2d 1218, 1222 (R.I. 1987) ("A trial justice fulfills his or her obligation to charge the jury properly by framing the issues in such a way that the instructions 'reasonably set forth all of the propositions of law that relate to material issues of fact which the evidence tends to support.'"). In this case, plaintiff implied that defendant mishandled the tachograph such that plaintiff was unable to authenticate the speed recording. By failing to present any further evidence or explanation, plaintiff failed to trigger the trial justice's obligation to issue the requested instruction. Thus, the trial justice did not abuse her discretion.
IV. Post-Trial Motions
After judgment entered for UPS, plaintiff filed two motions in an attempt to revise the jury verdict. Pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff first filed a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative a motion for new trial, arguing that (1) the jury instructions should not have addressed Michael's potential comparative negligence, (2) that Hogan was negligent as a matter of law, (3) that the trial justice erroneously precluded the admission of the tachograph speed evidence, and (4) that newly discovered evidence warranted a new trial. The plaintiff then filed a separate motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59, or in the alternative Rule 60(b), based on the newly discovered evidence cited in the first motion. The trial justice addressed and denied both of plaintiff's motions at a hearing on December 17, 1999.
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial justice erred by denying her judgment as a matter of law motion on Hogan's negligence. On a motion for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50, the trial justice:
"'considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, without weighing the evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and draws from the record all reasonable inferences that support the position of the nonmoving party. * * * If, after such a review, there remain factual issues upon which reasonable persons might draw different conclusions, the motion for [judgment as a matter of law] must be denied, and the issues must be submitted to the jury for determination.'" Raimbeault v. Takeuchi Manufacturing (U.S.), Ltd., 722 A.2d 1056, 1062 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Mellor v. O'Connor, 712 A.2d 375, 377 (R.I. 1998)).
Moreover, " n reviewing a trial justice's decision on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, this Court 'is bound by the same rules and [standards] as the trial justice.'" Raimbeaul
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