 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Hernandez-Gomez v. Leonardo5/14/1996
En Banc
FELDMAN, Chief Justice.
Amparo Hernandez-Gomez (Plaintiff) was rendered quadriplegic on November 6, 1988, when the 1981 Volkswagen Rabbit in which Plaintiff was a passenger veered off the road and flipped over, smashing her head and shoulders against the car's roof. Plaintiff alleges that the design of the Rabbit's occupant restraint system failed to provide adequate protection in foreseeable rollover accidents. The restraint system for the car's right front passenger seat consisted of a shoulder belt that automatically moved into place diagonally across the chest when the door was shut, a Knee bolster, and a seat designed to prevent the occupant from submarining under the dashboard in a head-on collision. Plaintiff claims that the lack of a manual lap belt made the car's design defective and unreasonably dangerous to its occupants, thereby enhancing her injuries.
The trial court granted Volkswagen's motion for partial summary Judgment on the ground that the Rabbit's passive restraint system complied with FMVSS 208 (Standard 208), a federal motor vehicle and motor vehicle equipment performance standard, and that Plaintiff's claim was therefore preempted by the Safety Act. Plaintiff sought relief from the trial court's order by bringing a special action in the court of appeals, which declined jurisdiction. This court then granted review to answer the fundamental question of whether an automobile manufacturer can be liable under state tort law for a product design defect when that design is permitted by the Safety Act's standards. Hernandez-Gomez v. Leonardo, 180 Ariz. 297, 298, 884 P.2d 183, 184 (1994) (Hernandez-Gomez I). Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 120 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1992), we answered this question in the affirmative.
The United States Supreme Court granted Volkswagen's petition for certiorari, vacated our opinion, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the Court's intervening decision in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 131 L. Ed. 2d 385, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995). Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Hernandez-Gomez, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 1819 (1995) (Hernandez-Gomez II).
On remand, we requested additional briefing from counsel and heard argument on the question of whether our holding in Hernandez-Gomez I could stand in light of Myrick. Accordingly, we begin with a summary of our previous opinion and an analysis of Myrick.
Discussion
A. Hernandez-Gomez I
In Cipollone, the Supreme Court stated:
If Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority, . . . there is no need to infer congressional intent to preempt state laws . . . .
505 U.S. at 517, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Relying primarily on this principle, we determined in Hernandez-Gomez I that federal preemption analysis was limited to ascertaining a federal statute's express preemptive reach and held:
1. Our analysis of preemption by the Safety Act ends with a reading of the text of the preemption clause and its companion savings clause. Hernandez-Gomez I, 180 Ariz. at 305, 884 P.2d at 191.
2. The two clauses work together to forbid states from enacting conflicting regulatory standards but allow common-law tort actions. Id.
We therefore concluded that Plaintiff's action for defective design of the restraint system was not preempted by the exp
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Arizona Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|