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Hernandez-Gomez v. Leonardo5/14/1996
lready given the railway express permission to do so. Requiring local permission to do something federal law already explicitly authorizes is vastly different from imposing liability on a business for failing to do something the statute does not prohibit and the business had express permission to do.
Thus, imposing common-law liability for failure to include manual lap belts for protection in rollover accidents does not take away a choice. In addition, it would neither stifle innovation and competition nor thwart the purpose of reducing death and injury due to traffic accidents. Rather, the effect of common-law liability here would be to compensate Plaintiff for injuries allegedly caused by the manufacturer's choice not to do something allowed under the standards: install manual lap belts to provide rollover protection. Thus, there is no obstruction of Congress' objectives.
Finally, it must be determined if liability under common law will interfere with Congress' chosen method of accomplishing its objectives. Here too the statute and standards speak directly to the chosen method. The statute's declared purpose of reducing death and injuries is to be accomplished by "establishing motor vehicle safety standards for motor vehicles and equipment." 15 U.S.C. § 1381. These standards are defined as "minimum standard for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment performance." 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2) (emphasis added). The standards define the methodology more specifically in stating that the reduction in death and injuries is to be accomplished "by specifying vehicle crashworthiness requirements in terms of forces and accelerations . . . ." 49 C.F.R. 571.208 S2.
Imposition of tort liability under Plaintiff's theory does not interfere with Congress' chosen method because it does not establish any performance standard. Standard 208 sets out minimum safety standards that are uniformly applicable to all cars manufactured, whereas tort liability operates to encourage behavior but not require it. Manufacturers may weigh the risks and benefits and choose to live with the occasional lawsuit rather than change their behavior. See Wood, 865 F.2d at 424 (Seyla, J., Dissenting).
Conclusion
Any preemptive effect of 15 U.S.C. § 1392(2) is limited to those state crashworthiness standards applicable to a particular aspect of vehicle or vehicle equipment performance, in terms of forces and accelerations, measured on anthropomorphic dummies in test crashes, when there is a federal standard already applicable to that same aspect of performance. Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field of performance standards. Arizona has recognized no common-law principle and has promulgated no regulatory law in actual conflict with federal law; thus, if Volkswagen is found liable in tort under the theory claimed by Plaintiff, there will be no conflict with federal law. It was possible for Volkswagen to both comply with federal law and be found liable in tort under Plaintiff's theory. Therefore, a finding of liability under state law would not interfere with or obstruct Congress' chosen methods of accomplishing the objectives set by the Safety Act.
Accordingly, we find there is neither express nor implied preemption of Plaintiff's claim. As one court aptly noted:
It remains to be seen whether a jury [will find the manufacturer] acted unreasonably, notwithstanding its alleged compliance with [Standard 208.] The issue before this court at this time is whether the plaintiff has the right to ask the jury to decide.
Tebbetts, 665 A.2d at 347, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965) ("Compliance with a legislative enactment or an ad
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