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CLOHESSY v. BACHELOR5/21/1996
ling of a minor child is at least as great and as legitimate as the apprehension that is inspired by a plaintiff being personally within the zone of danger." Id., 155-57.
We therefore conclude, on the basis of sound public policy and principles of reasonable foreseeability, that a plaintiff should be allowed to recover, within certain limitations, for emotional distress as a result of harm done to a third party. In doing so, we join the courts> of other jurisdictions that have adopted the rule of foreseeability in various forms.
We are aware that the application of pure rules of foreseeability could lead to unlimited liability. " here are ample policy concerns for setting limits or administrative boundaries establishing the permissible instances of recovery. There are fears of flooding the courts> with `spurious and fraudulent claims'; problems of proof of the damage suffered; exposing the defendant to an endless number of claims; and economic burdens on industry." Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So.2d 559, 566 (La. 1990). For example, " t would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all human activity if the defendant who has endangered one person were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person disturbed by reason of it, including every bystander shocked at an accident, and every distant relative of the person injured, as well as all his friends." W. Prosser & P. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 54, p. 366; Thing v. La Chusa, supra, 48 Cal.3d 666-67.
With these considerations in mind, and borrowing from the experience of other jurisdictions, we agree that specific limitations must be imposed upon the reasonable foreseeability rule. We recognize that those limitations, albeit somewhat arbitrary, are "necessary in order not to leave the liability of a negligent defendant open to undue extension by the verdict of sympathetic juries, who under our system must define and apply any general rule to the facts of the case before them. . . . Prosser, Torts (4th Ed.) § 54, p. 335." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Amodio v. Cunningham, supra, 182 Conn. 93 n. 11; Thing v. La Chusa, supra, 48 Cal.3d 666. Accordingly, for a cause of action for bystander emotional distress, we adopt the reasonable foreseeability rule subject to the following conditions.
First, we hold that in order to recover for emotional distress, the bystander must be "closely related to the injury victim." Thing v. La Chusa, supra, 48 Cal.3d 667. In this case, the relationship of the parent and the sibling to the victim satisfies this condition. "The class of potential plaintiffs should be limited to those who because of their relationship suffer the greatest emotional distress. When the right to recover is limited in this manner, the liability bears a reasonable relationship to the culpability of the negligent defendant." Id. This court has previously recognized the importance of such relationships within the framework of our tort law. For example, the court recognized in the context of loss of consortium between husband and wife that "the mental and emotional anguish caused by seeing a healthy, loving, companionable mate turn into a shell of a person is undeniably a real injury." Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 493, 408 A.2d 260 (1979). We leave to another day the question of what other relationships may qualify.
Second, the bystander's emotional injury must be caused by the contemporaneous sensory perception of the event or conduct that causes the injury; Thing v. La Chusa, supra, 48 Cal.3d 668; Cameron v. Pepin, supra, 610 A.2d 284; Portee v. Jaffee, supra, 84 N.J. 99; Marchetti
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