 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Gleason v. Kueker8/15/2001
ndsen, 251 Iowa 115, 121, 99 N.W.2d 287, 291 (1959). Finally, the court has reaffirmed its faith in the jury to make the present value reduction based on all the relevant facts and circumstances shown by the evidence. Id.; see also Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 170 N.W.2d at 664 (noting juries could draw inferences from material matters shown); Jackson v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 238 Iowa 1253, 1267, 30 N.W.2d 97, 105 (1947) (noting jury's wide discretion in assessing personal injury damages, including discretion to consider lessened purchasing and earning power of money); accord St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Needham, 52 F. 371, 378 (8th Cir. 1892) (noting "human ingenuity seems incapable of formulating a rule which shall specify every circumstance, chance, and probability that a jury may consider, and none that it may not . . ." ). While certain courts have questioned the wisdom of relegating such a complex economic calculation to a jury, others have noted that the use of economics in a litigation setting is in any event less than exact and the determination should be left to the sound discretion of the jury. See Cox v. Crown Coco, 544 N.W.2d 490, 500 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); Florida Uniform Civil Jury Instruction 6.10, comment 2; Cf. O'Shea, 677 F.2d at 1201; 3 Stein on Personal Injury Damages, ยง 15:3. Iowa appears to have endorsed the "sound discretion" approach.
IV. Disposition
Turning now to the facts of this case, it becomes evident that we must adopt the Gleasons' position. Although Kueker compellingly argues that the numbers reflect no present value reduction, to adopt his position would require us to speculate as to the jury's calculations. We decline to do so.
We must assume that the jury acted in accordance with its instruction and made a determination of present value. Schwennen, 471 N.W.2d at 887. The jury very well could have determined from Mary Gleason's medical billing records that the cost of medical care was rising at a higher rate than the prevailing interest rate, justifying a complete offset of the two and adoption of the approximate figure offered by Gleason. See Burgess v. Mid-Florida Service, 609 So.2d 637, 638 (Fl. Ct. App. 1992) (noting jury's failure to arrive at present value calculation smaller than future damages award did not necessarily prove failure to follow instructions but may have been "consistent with an intentional determination that the present value is equal to future damages by application of a 'total offset' calculation.") In the alternative, the jury could have reduced Mary Gleason's $130,000 figure to $126,400 not because it was taking into account the assumptions suggested by Kueker, but because it believed inflation would not offset the discount rate. Because there was some evidence from which the jury could have made this present value determination, we conclude the future medical expense award should be affirmed. See Miller v. Young, 168 N.W.2d 45, 53 (Iowa 1969).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kueker's motion for new trial and did not err in rejecting his request for remittitur.
AFFIRMED.
Page 1 2 3 Iowa Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|