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Payne v. Wallace8/14/2001
tedly, a party could unreasonably deny requests for admissions and thereby delay proceedings and increase trial preparation costs for an opponent, and then avoid Rule 37(c) sanctions by admitting the requests after the costs have been incurred. Such misconduct may be sanctioned, however, under other provisions of Idaho law. First, I.C. ยง 12-123 authorizes the award of attorney fees as a sanction for "frivolous conduct," which includes conduct that "obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action" or "is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law." The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure also offer other remedies for discovery abuses. Rule 26(f)(1) specifies that the signature of a party or his attorney on a discovery request or response constitutes a certification that the content of the document is "not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." If the trial court finds that a certification has been made in violation of this rule, the court may impose upon the person who made the certification or the party on whose behalf the response was made, an appropriate sanction, including reasonable attorney fees incurred because of the violation. In addition, Rule 11(a)(1) imposes a similar certification standard for signatures on any "pleading, motion, or other paper," which includes discovery responses, and the rule empowers the trial court to impose sanctions upon the attorney or the represented party for violations of the certification. Because these alternative remedies exist, we are confident that our holding, disallowing Rule 37(c) sanctions where an admission was made belatedly but in sufficient time to avoid the necessity for the opponent to prove the matter at trial, will not foster unscrupulous discovery practices. The denial of the Paynes' request for Rule 37(c) sanctions is affirmed.
D. Award of Costs to Wallace Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 68
Finally, we address the Paynes' contention that the district court committed error in awarding to Wallace part of his costs incurred in defending the action.
Approximately one month before trial, Wallace made an offer of judgment for $2,400 pursuant to I.R.C.P. 68. The Paynes declined the offer and subsequently received a jury verdict for a lesser amount, $1,948.51. The court thereafter determined that the Paynes were entitled to recover costs under Rule 54(d)(1) because they were the prevailing party on the primary claim in the case, Diana's cause of action for personal injuries. Of the allowable costs claimed by the Paynes, $450.02 was incurred before service of Wallace's offer of judgment. Thus, the Paynes' "adjusted award" for purposes of I.R.C.P. 68(b) was $2,398.53 ($1,948.51 verdict plus $450.02 in costs incurred prior to the offer of judgment). Because this adjusted award was less than the rejected offer of judgment, the district court ordered the Paynes to pay Wallace's costs incurred after the offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68(b)(i) and ordered Wallace to pay the Paynes' costs incurred prior to the offer pursuant to Rule 68(b)(ii).
On appeal, the Paynes contend that the district court did not correctly compute their "adjusted award" under Rule 68(b) because the court did not include any amount in the adjusted award for their attorney fees incurred before service of the offer of judgment. The Paynes' argument lacks merit. The district court included nothing in the adjusted award for attorney fees because the court determined that the Paynes were not entitled to an award of attorney fees. The district court held, and we agree, that the Rule 68(b) reference to the inclusion of "any attor
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