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Engvall v. Soo Line Railroad Company8/2/2001
oo Line can maintain a state law cause of action based on a violation of the LIA when the alleged equipment problem does not violate Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regulations. Holding that Soo Line survives summary judgment on that basis, we turn to whether the fact that Engvall could not have brought a direct action against GM under the FELA precludes the existence of common liability, a prerequisite to a claim for contribution. To answer the question whether GM and Soo Line have common liability, we must determine whether a state law claim against GM based on the LIA is preempted by federal law. Finally, we address whether Soo Line may pursue its claim for indemnity even though the FELA imposes a non-delegable duty on employers.
I.
The background for this lawsuit is the FELA, a general negligence statute, Waymire v. Norfolk and W. Ry., 218 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 2000), that allows railroad employees to recover from their employers for employment-related injuries caused by employer negligence, Engvall I, 605 N.W.2d at 739 n.1; 45 U.S.C. § 51. Under the FELA, the employer's duty is non-delegable. Shenker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 374 U.S. 1, 7 (1963). At the same time, the LIA "'imposes upon the [railroad] carrier an absolute and continuing duty to maintain the locomotive, and all parts and appurtenances thereof, in proper condition, and safe to operate . . .áwithout unnecessary peril to life or limb.'" Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 317 U.S. 481, 485 (1943) (quoting S. Ry. v. Lunsford, 297 U.S. 398, 401 (1936)); see Engvall I, 605 N.W.2d at 739 n.1 (noting that the LIA "imposes an absolute requirement that employers provide safe equipment"); see also 49 U.S.C. §á20701(1) (1994). The LIA differs from the FELA in that the LIA does not confer any right of action on injured employees. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 188 (1949); Engvall I, 605 N.W.2d at 739 n.1. The United States Supreme Court has construed the LIA to be an amendment to the FELA, so that "proof of [an LIA violation] is effective to show negligence as a matter of law" under the FELA. Urie, 337 U.S. at 189; Engvall I, 605 N.W.2d at 739 n.1. The "prime purpose" of both the FELA and the LIA is "the protection of railroad employees * * * from injury due to industrial accident," Urie, 337 U.S. at 191 (citation omitted), and the LIA is "to be read and applied with the [FELA]," Balt. & Ohio Ry. v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521, 528 (1925). As noted, the FRA may promulgate regulations implementing the requirements of the LIA. 49 U.S.C. § 20103; 49 C.F.R. § 1.49(c)(5), (g).
The parties agree on two significant matters. First, that the SD60 handbrake is a "part" or "appurtenance" of a locomotive within the meaning of the LIA. And second, even though the LIA refers only to "railroad carrier ," the parties agree that manufacturers of railroad equipment are also subject to the requirements of the LIA. See 49 U.S.C. §á21302 (1994); 49 C.F.R. 229.7(b) (2000).
Does Soo Line have a state law cause of action based on a violation of the LIA when the claimed equipment problem does not violate FRA regulations? GM argues that an action based on the LIA must allege a violation of an FRA regulation, because a locomotive part or appurtenance complies with the LIA as a matter of law unless the part or appurtenance violates a specific FRA regulation. On this basis GM argues, relying principally on the Supreme Court's decision in Groeger, that "courts and juries have no authority to judge locomotive designs deficient that do not violate a specific FRA regulation, for regulation remains FRA's exclusive province." GM's reliance on Groeger is unwarranted.
In Groeger, a locomotive engineer was killed when the steam boiler
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